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Preface
The last two decades has been characterized by a progressive disintegration of the production
process, in which manufacturing or services goods realized home could be combined with those
done abroad. What does this imply?That intermediate goods cross borders several time during
the manufacturing process. This explains why intermediate inputs have become the new actors
of international trade. In line with this ndings we propose an analysis where intermediate
inputs play a key role in a contest characterized by di¤erent organization of rms.
The structure of the thesis is organized in three papers. In the rst paper1, using data from
COMTRADE and WDI, we propose an empirical analysis of the determinants of the choices to
fragment production (outsourcing or vertical FDI). We consider four European countries (Italy,
Germany, France and United Kingdom)as origin countries, and eleven East and South European
countries as potential locations for the foreign productions. We investigate the amount of
imports in parts and components of each of these four EU countries, as a function of wage, rule
of law and certain indicators of development in the eleven destination countries.We nd results
consistent with the theory.
In the second paper, we analyse from a theoretical point of view the choice between exports
and FDI. Considering an economy with 3 countries, each with a di¤erent trade policy, we study
the e¤ect of trade on the reallocation of resources, in a contest where rms could engage in
domestic production, exports and horizontal FDI activities. In this framework, where we allow
for asymmetric trade costs, we analyze the e¤ect of changes in trade policy barriers on di¤erent
type of rms. The asymmetry introduced gives raise to new interesting insights in terms of
preferential trade agreements.
1The rst paper corresponds to the rst chapter, the second paper corresponds to the second chapter and so
on.
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Building on the previous framework, in the third paper we extend the analysis so that to
consider the role of intra-industry trade. In particular, this paper analyses the choice between
FDI and Exports in a framework where the existence of intermediate inputs makes MNF ac-
tivities a¤ected by trade costs. We make the production of the nal good variety requires a
particular input combination between services and labor manufacture. Hence, when a sub-
sidiary is built abroad this service input has to be imported from the home nation. This makes
the total marginal costs of selling via FDI rising with distance. Some asymmetries between
countries, in terms of di¤erent locations, are assumed. This will make the equilibrium cuto¤s
related to distance. The existence of intermediate inputs and costs linked to distance leads to
a result in which the ratio of MNF rms shrinks when distance becomes important.
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Chapter 1
Determinants of International
Production of Intermediate Inputs
1.1 Introduction
Beginning from 1990s an increase of outsourcing activities by rms has been observed. One
reason that has been suggested in order to explain this change in production has been the
decline in transaction costs. The rapid spread of this phenomenon helps explain why it has
become such an attractive topic in the economic literature.
There is a large literature that tries to explain the trend of outsourcing. It starts with
the seminal paper by Coase (1937), later developed by Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart
(1986), and Grossman and Helpman (2002a,b). More recently, the literatures examine from a
theoretical point of view the rms decision about where locate the sub-contracted activities,
by taking into consideration how the contract environment can a¤ect the successful conclusion
of the outsourcing relationship. The key element in this literature is the issue of incomplete
contracts. One important theoretical study in this eld has been done by Grossman-Helpman
in Outsourcing in a Global Economy. This paper will be the focus of the present analysis.
After a summary of their theoretical model, we will undertake an empirical investigation based
on their economic conclusions, in order to understand what are the main determinants of the
decision of where locate the subcontracted activities. It is important to keep in mind that in
the present empirical work, only aggregate data are considered. The reason of this choice is
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linked to the di¢culty of obtaining micro level rm data. However, this choice would have
implication on our dependent variable. In fact, the dependent variable can only be considered
as an imperfect measure of outsourcing.
We focus the empirical analysis on the amount of imports of parts and components in
four European countries: Italy, Germany, France and United Kingdom. On the side, so as
potential exporters, and hence as possible places where to locate sub-contracted activities, we
have considered eleven East and South European countries. The data used in this paper are
taken from di¤erent databases, as will be indicated in section 1.5.2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 explains the di¤erent ways of
realizing the modern o¤shore assembly processing. Section 1.3 describes the Helpman-Grossman
model of outsourcing. Section 1.4 includes some statistical considerations about trade in parts
and components. Sections 1.5 and 1.6 presents the econometric work supporting the view that
the contract environment plays an important role in explaining the decision of outsourcing.
Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Dening Outsourcing
Before starting to discuss about outsourcing decisions it could be helpful to explain what gener-
ally is meant by this word. According to Price (2001) fragmentation of production can have two
di¤erent dimensions: the ownership dimension and the outsourcing dimension. The ownership
dimension represents a situation in which some activities of the chain of production are realized
in di¤erent countries, but still under the ownership and control of a single rm (this is the case
of multinational rm). However, this represents an old way of sharing production, which was
used with the purpose of reducing the transaction costs, whereas, in the outsourcing dimension
there is the loss of ownership. In this latter dimension the fragmentation of production, and so
the fact that certain activities, such as assembling and processing, are realized by rms in low
wage countries, is characterized by the existence of a contract. As Price suggests, outsourcing
can be considered as a dimension of fragmentation that lies in between total ownership and
complete arms length transactions. With respect to the outsourcing relationship there are
two important elements to consider: the long term nature of this relation and the exchange of
8
information between the nal producer and the input supplier.
1.3 The Grossman-Helpman Model
In Outsourcing in a Global Economy (2001), Helpman and Grossman consider two countries,
so called North and South, and two industries. They assume North can produce both a ho-
mogeneous consumer good, z, and a di¤erentiated good, y. On the contrary, the South can
only produce the homogeneous one, because it has not the know-how needed to produce the
di¤erentiated one. They further assume that both countries can produce intermediate goods,
that are needed for the production of the di¤erentiated good,y.
As we are in the usual intra-industry trade context, consumers consider the di¤erentiated
goods y as imperfect substitutes. For this reason the classical CES utility function is adopted
in order to describe the typical consumers maximization problem
U = z(1 )
"Z 1
0
Z n(l)
0
y(j;l)djdl
# 

with 0 <  and < 1. In this equation, z represents the consumption of homogeneous good,
and y(j;l) the consumption of the j   th variety located at point l on a unit circle. They
associate each good y with a point on the circumference of a unit circle, in such a way that the
position of the nal good y, represents the characteristics l of the intermediate input needed
for its production. Hence, consumers consider the goods at the same location on the circle as
di¤erent. The elasticity of substitution between any pair of varieties is " = 1=(1  ).
Entry
For what concern the production process in di¤erentiated good, Helpman and Grossman (2001)
assume the following. Norths rms can become producers of a variety of good y after having
realized a certain investment in product design. This latter is the cost of entry by the nal good
producer in the North, and can be represented as the amount of labor needed to produce good
y times the Northern wage rate, fnw
N . However, the production of the nal di¤erentiated
good requires an intermediate input, which Norths rms cannot realized by themselves. For
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this reason they need to outsource the production of this input to some other rms which can
be located in the North or in the South. This gives raise to the main problem this model: since
the characteristics of the input supplier are completely random, the search and eventually the
recognition of an appropriate input supplier partner involves some di¢culties.
The input suppliers can be located in both countries. Following Helpman and Grossman, in
order to become a supplier of intermediate goods it is necessary that the input supplier makes a
certain investment in expertise (or investment in the realization of a prototype). This expertise
can be represented by a point on a unit circle. Helpman and Grossman assume that this
investment in expertise represents a cost that is higher than the cost of designing a single nal
product. This would imply that the number of nal producers is greater than the number of
intermediate producers. They indicate the entry cost by wif im, where i = S;N . f
i
m represents
the amount of labor needed to produce the input by the intermediate producers, that can be
located both in the North, and in the South.
Search
Once rms enter into the intermediate sector, a second step takes place: nal producers of
di¤erentiated goods have to look for appropriate input suppliers, in the sense that input sup-
pliers expertise is strictly closed to the input characteristics that the nal producers need.
The search and associated research activities require fs units of northern labour at a cost of
wNfs. In their working paper, Grossman and Helpman (2002), they considered the following
search cost : cs = w
nix2 with i = S;N . Where, x represents the search intensity in market
i; ix2, represents the amount of units of labor in order to realize a search of intensity x, and
w represents the wage in the North, since they assume search is realized by Northern work-
ers. Here they assumed that nal producers are not guaranteed to nd all suppliers in a given
market, unless their search e¤orts are su¢ciently intense. However, in the recent version of the
paper1, they decided to simplify the analysis by considering only a xed cost of search, wNfs.
In this framework, it is crucial to nd an input supplier with an expertise linked with the nal
producers needs. In fact, if the latter fails in the choice of input suppliers location, it must
exit the industry.
1Review of Economic Studies (2005)
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As we have explained above, the realization of the customized inputs by the input supplier
requires an investment in a prototype. This investment can be considered as a cost in order to
obtain the customized input, so it depends on the distance between the suppliers expertise and
the nal producers need. The larger is this distance the higher will be the customization cost.
The xed cost of providing a particular component to a nal producer whose needs in term of
inputs are at a distance x from the suppliers expertise, is given by cp = w
iix. This represents
the suppliers cost of developing the prototype.
Bargaining and Contracting
After the nal producer has found an appropriate input supplier, the two rms start the nego-
tiation considering the characteristics of the local legal environment. The negotiation process is
divided into two steps. In the rst step, the two parts have to negotiate on the input suppliers
investment in customization, and on the payment for the development of the prototype. This is
also called the investment contract. In the second step the parties negotiate on the price and
quantity of the input to be sold. In this second part the contract is usually called the order
contract.
In this relationship, the input suppliers investment, even if it is perfectly observable, it is
not fully veriable to outside parties. The imperfect veriability of investment in a prototype
constraints the contracting possibilities. In order to deal with this incompleteness they use
elements of the theory of contract is necessary. Before continuing, could be interesting spending
few words on this theory. The theory of contracts has emerged as a consequence of the failures in
general equilibrium theory. These failures came from the fact that the real world is characterized
by asymmetries of information that strongly a¤ect economic relations, making it necessary to
develop some other tools capable of taking them into account. In order to do this has been
necessary to turn away temporarily from general equilibrium models. One of the main feature
of contract theory has been to put in evidence that the impossibility of writing a so called
complete contract. The reason is because there could exist some contingencies which are so
unpredictable to make impossible take them into account when writing the contract. This could
be the result of opportunity costs consideration: the cost of considering these contingencies is
higher than the benet. Another explanation could be that parties are not able to verify ex
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post the value of certain observed variables.
In this incomplete context, the possibility to renegotiate the contract assumes a di¤erent
meaning with respect to a situation in which contracts are complete. In fact, in the former
case, the possibility for the parties to renegotiate the contract in order to react to unforeseen
contingencies, can be seen rather than an e¢ciency loss, as a socially useful reaction. The
problem in incomplete contracts is not only related to asymmetric information. In fact, in
this model the information is symmetric, in the sense that all the variables are observed by
all the parties, but some other variables cannot be included, because they are observable but
non-veriable. The theory of incomplete contracts can be considered as a development of
the transaction cost theory (Coase 1937 and Williamson 1985). In this theory it is assumed
that, as agents are boundedly rational, contracts cannot be complete. As many investments in
relationship-specic assets, as in the Helpman-Grossman (H-G) model, are non-veriable, rms2
fear to lose the surplus created by their investment, so they can be induced to under-invest.
This is the so called hold up problem.
In Helpman-Grossamn model the incomplete contract argument is used as a possible deter-
minant in the choice of outsourcing decisions. They consider two di¤erent contexts. In the rst
one, the suppliers investment in the prototype is completely unveriable. In this case, since the
input supplier cannot engage in undertaking any initial investment, the rst stage negotiations
are completely useless. In the second context, the investment decisions of the input supplier
are partially veriable, so that there is a role for contracts, even if incomplete.
1.4 Outsourcing: The Evidence from Trade in Components
In order to understand the proportion and the trend of international fragmentation of produc-
tion3 we can consider real data. Before starting, we should highlight that international trade
data for a long time have not been distinguished between assembled products and components.
For this reason, it was impossible to establish the location where parts and components were
realized, the magnitude of this production and so on. This until when a revision to the Stan-
dard International Trade Classication (SITC-Rev 2 and 3) has permitted to easily obtain
2The input suppliers, in the contest of the Helpman-Grossman model
3Also called "Global Production Sharing"by Yeaple.
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SITC - Revision 3 - Code De scription
7119 Parts of steam boilers and auxiliary plants
7139 Internal com bustion engine parts
7149 Parts of engines and m otors, nes
7169 Parts of rotating eletric motors
72119 Parts of cultivating equipment
72129 Parts of harvesting m achinery
72139 Parts of dairy machinery
72198 Parts of wine m aking m achinery
72199 Parts of other agricultural machinery, nes
7239 Parts of construction m achinery
72449 Parts of spinning and extruding machinery
72469 Parts of looms and knitting m achinery
72479 Parts of textile m achinery, nes
7259 Parts of paper mil and paper making mach.
72689 Parts of bookbinding machinery
7269 Parts of printing and typesetting machinery
72719 Parts of grain miling machinery
72729 Parts of food processing machinery
72819 Parts of m achine tools for special industries
72839 Parts of m ineral working machinery
72849 Parts of m achines for special industries, nes
7369 Parts of m achine tools for metal working
73719 Parts of foundry equipm ent
7373 W elding, brazing etc. mach
7429 Parts of pumps for liquids
7439 Parts of centrifuges and filters
74419 Parts of fork lift trucks
7449 Parts of lifting and loading machines
74519 Parts of power hand tools
74999 Parts of non-eletric machinery, nes
759 Parts of office and adding m achinery
764 Parts of telecom munications equipment
77129 Parts of eletric power machinery
772 Parts of switchgear
77579 Parts of dom estic eletrical equipm ent
77829 Parts of eletric lam ps and bulbs
77889 Parts of eletrical m achinery, nes
784 Parts of m otor vehicles and accessories
78539 Parts of carriages and cycles
78689 Parts of trailers and non-m otor vehicles
79199 Parts of railroad equipm ent and vehicles
7929 Parts of aircraft and helicopters
intra-industry trade in parts and components. Hence, it is only in the late 1970s that, thanks
to the shift to the SITC Revision 2 system, the number of products groups composed only of
components started to increase. In particular, the most detailed and complete group is the
one of machinery and transport (SITC 7). For this reason, we decided to built our dependent
variable, value of imports of parts and components, on SITC-Rev 3. Following the classication
by Yeats (2001), this is the list of parts and components that has been taken into consideration
for the construction of the dependent variable.
How great is the relative importance of trade in parts and components among the four
European countries that we are considering? The following table provides some evidence in
relation to the value of imports of parts and components within the transport and machinery
sector (SITC 7), for what concern the four EU countries with respect to the eleven partners.
In order to understand the role of the European economic area in promoting the international
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P a rtne rs Va lue of im p orts (in $) in 2000
Ita ly B ulgaria 55887224
Croatia 33817908
Cy prus 5618942
Cz ech  Rep. 373977888
G reec e 45126140
Hungary 477184800
P oland 1081546240
Rom ania 211029088
Slovak ia 533861760
Sloven ia 403851648
Turk ey 444719264
G e rm a ny B ulgaria 102220312
Croatia 109553912
Cy prus 135076208
Cz ech  Rep. 5767663104
G reec e 75471808
Hungary 6874668032
P oland 3339293952
Rom ania 418428448
Slovak ia 1733964800
Sloven ia 952288256
Turk ey 1013970624
Fra n c e B ulgaria 29203236
Croatia 33500148
Cy prus 1993141
Cz ech  Rep. 699475712
G reec e 32327476
Hungary 1325819264
P oland 677575232
Rom ania 240145280
Slovak ia 336709376
Sloven ia 469584640
Turk ey 728815424
Uni te d  Kingdo m B ulgaria 10088911
Croatia 15987397
Cy prus 189622848
Cz ech  Rep. 800285312
G reec e 85199256
Hungary 720353280
P oland 510725312
Rom ania 61895536
Slovak ia 91718832
Sloven ia 68347840
Turk ey 432121216
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fragmentation of production, we decided to consider the relationship between four main EU
countries and eleven relevant partners in South-Eastern Europe. It could be easily anticipated
that the reduction of trade barriers in regional arrangements, like EU or EFTA, has a¤ected in a
positive way the growth of trade in parts and components. Comparing the magnitude of trade in
regional arrangements with trade with third countries, we observe that the former has increased
at a faster rate. Consequently, we could expect that this trend will continue with respect to
the new arrivals in EU. However, this reduction in trade barriers in regional arrangements is
not the only reason for explaining this trend. In relation to the Helpman Grossman model,
we should in fact consider the that regional arrangements can guarantee a more secure way of
trading. In this environment the existence of a well dened and stable legal system creates an
incentive for production sharing. The following gures represent the trend of imports in parts
and components in each EU country. In particular, the trend of the total amount of imports
of parts and components in transport and machinery sector of Italy, Germany, France and UK
respectively:
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Using the as a benchmark the Grossman-Helpman model, we can analyze those factors
which seem to contribute the most in the development of North-South contracting activity,
and so in the expansion of trade in components. As suggested by Grossman-Helpman, wage
di¤erences between developed and developing countries play an extremely important role in
explaining the bid up of international fragmentation of production. According to Yeats (2001),
in order to remain competitive in international markets, many rms in high labor cost EU
countries have decided to move part of their labor intensive activities (assembling, processing
and repairing), to those countries with lower wages (Eastern and Central Europe). However,
as pointed out by Helpman-Grossman, other factors, like human capital, R&D, contractual
environment, transportation and telecommunication technologies, seem to play a key role in
explaining the dimension and the direction of this global production sharing. Another important
element is represented by distance: gravity equation could help explaining the size of this
fragmentation. In fact, higher transport costs, cultural di¤erences a¤ect in negatively the
choice of fragment production. More precisely, there could be a trade o¤ between distance
and wage advantages. In order to explain this argument lets consider the sub-Saharan Africa
case. Sub-Saharan Africa has not become a relevant partner in o¤shoring assembly processing
activity, in spite of very low labor costs. The reason is probably linked to its own geographical
position. This nding suggests that in our empirical study, country like Cyprus, will play not
a less relevant role in explaining the ongoing fragmentation of production.
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Also tari¤s schedule plays an important role in determining the location of part of the pro-
duction process. The outward processing relief arrangements, that are provisions contained
in the European Community tari¤ schedules, permits to parts and components to be exported
for further assembly or processing. When these products are re-imported, they can be totally
or partially exempted from duties. These provisions are applied to European Community coun-
tries. This last element highlights the importance of being part of an economic area. Lets
consider the EU as an example. The advantages that the EU countries get from being members
could act as an incentive explaining why a big part of the disintegration of production takes
place among the countries member of that area. Even if, from a geographical point of view,
there are other countries with a more convenient position; for example Ukraine, Belarus, are
from a geographical point of view nearer to the core of Europe.
1.5 Empirical Investigation
In this part of the paper we take a closer look at the main determinants of the localization
of part of the production process. Since we are interested in analyzing the two main activi-
ties through which fragmentation is taking place, outsourcing and vertical integration, we will
analyze both of them. Lets start with outsourcing. Following Helpman-Grossman, the main
elements that characterize the input supplier as a suitable partner in a sub-contracted activity
are the cost of investment in the prototype, the thickness of the market, the wage rate and the
legal environment in the country where the input supplier is located.
The suppliers investment cost in the prototype is characterized by the quality of the inputs
required by the specic nal producer. This customization costs is increasing with the distance
in expertise between the two parties: the greater is the distance between the suppliers expertise
and the nal producers needs the larger is the customization cost. This distance in expertise
can be approximated by the level of human capital (h), R&D, or success in innovation (I). The
function representing the customization costs is the following: i = f(H;R&D;I), where 
is the customization cost. The justication for human capital, as an element for representing
customization cost, it is linked to recent ndings where is conrmed that rms reveal preference
for high skilled employees, even if this implies higher costs in term of wage. The signicance
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of human capital in production is presented in several theoretical studies such as Grossman-
Helpman (1991), with clear implications for the nal producers choice in the search for partner.
This model studied the link between the quality of education and the rate of innovation,putting
in evidence that the increase in the aggregate stock of human capital has the e¤ect of increasing
the R&D activities. The rms will favor human capital in the production process because the
costs between skilled and unskilled workers are diminishing due to higher availability of skilled
employees. This could also imply that the contracting environment with a high distance in
R&D expertise between partners will become unsatisfactory for the nal producer. As the
customization of the components implies the development of a prototype with characteristics
that fully satisfy the nal producers needs, we can consider this quality as a¤ected by R&D.
The R&D resources are dependent on the R&D expenditures in each country and the increase in
the R&D resources inside a rm or between parties means a higher probability for a successful
innovation. Based on this we assume that the demand for intermediate inputs is strictly related
to their own quality.
In what follow we consider the role of Contract enforcement. In fact, the other element
that seems to play a relevant role in explaining the choice of where to outsource is represented
by the quality of the institutional system. Protection of property rights and the quality of
the government represent reliable measures of quality of institutions. Empirical tests on these
measures conrm their positive and signicant e¤ect on the economic performance of the coun-
try considered. It is straightforward to understand that good quality of these institutions will
promote the credibility of governments commitment. What has been used in the present paper
in order to represent the quality of the institutions is an index intended to measure the extent
of the rule of law in each of the eleven countries. This index, so called rule of law, can assume
values from 0 to 6, where the higher scale indicates the better quality of institutions. This
measure comes from the International Country Risk Guide. Unfortunately, this index is not
available for two countries, Croatia and Slovenia.
For what concerns wage, a higher wage level in the destination country is expected to
discourage the choice of outsourcing there.
The last element that seems to a¤ect the choice of where to locate the outsource partner is
represented by the search costs. In fact, since rms need to nd a supplier for their components,
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the greater is the number of input suppliers in a country, the more protable it is for nal
producer to search for partners there. This because a search of a given intensity is more likely
to nd a potential supplier when there are more input suppliers are available. For this reason
we will use, as a variable that can reduce the search costs, the thickness of the destination
market. In this paper the thickness of the market is represented by the number of suppliers
present in each country that we consider. The thickness of the market will be called (th). To
summarize, in the following equation we indicate the variables that play an important role in
the decision of implementing outsourcing: out = f(i; thi; wi; i).
Very similar aspects characterize vertical integration.
1.5.1 Hypothesis for Empirical Testing
The outsourcing is modeled as an activity that requires rst of all searching for partners, and
later on a relation specic investment which will be characterized by incomplete contracts. In
this empirical analysis there are key element to focus on, and these are represented by the
investment in the prototype, the wage, the nature of the contracting environment and the
thickness of the destination market. Based on the previous theoretical background we can
formulate the following hypothesis:
 the investment in R&D as well as the educational level in the destination country is ex-
pected to lower the customization costs, and so increase the attractiveness of outsourcing;
 the thicker is the market, the more easy is to nd a partner for the nal producer. In fact
the thickness by increasing the level of competition, should reduce search cost of the nal
producer;
 a higher wage level in the destination country is expected to a¤ect in a negative way the
incentives to outsource to that country. In their paper, Grossman and Helpman nd that
wage can be considered as endogenously determined by the level of outsourcing in those
countries4;
4We will see that the empirical results are not conrming this nding.
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 the quality of the legal system, or the contract environment, is expected to a¤ect in a
positive way the choice of outsourcing, as a consequence of the fact that the higher is the
quality if the legal system (), the greater is the protability of the searching activity.
1.5.2 Data Denition and Variables
In this paper we deal with eleven East and South European countries as possible partners
in the outsourcing relationships. The nal producers are located in four European countries,
Italy, Germany, France and UK. We will consider the bilateral trade between each of the four
EU countries with respect to the 11 East and South European countries. These 11 countries
are Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia and Turkey. The aim of this paper is to investigate the amount of imports in parts and
components of each of these four EU countries, as a function of wage, rule of law and certain
indicators of development in the eleven destination countries.
Before choosing for pooling, since we suspect the existence of some heterogeneity among
these eleven destination countries (and so problems of heteroskedasticity will arise) we undertake
the test for the validity of pooling. This test, which uses the F-statistic, suggests the possibility
to pool the data. In particular this happens when we consider heterogeneity by years. Whereas,
if we construct a panel by considering heterogeneity by countries, the F-test, does not allow
us to use pool estimation. As a consequence of the fact that the estimation results obtained
by considering heterogeneity by countries are not robust, we will only consider heterogeneity
by years. It is important to note that the dependent variables that have been used cannot
distinguish between the parts and components that represent intra-rm trade and the parts and
components that are in fact outsourced. This implies that what is estimated in the following
regressions is a combination between outsourcing and intra-rm trade.
Empirical ndings suggest that outsourcing is more likely in industries where the R&D
expenditures are at the intermediate level. For this reason, we collect data from transport and
machinery industry (non electrical machinery, electrical machinery and transport equipment).
We will consider the amount of imports in parts and components of each EU countries from
the eleven destination countries during the time period 1993-2001. We will test two possible
proxy of outsourcing. With the rst proxy, we analyze the main determinants of imports of
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parts and components in machinery with respect to their value added (IMVA). While with the
second proxy, we represent the dependent variable as the countrys market share of parts and
components (SHAI). These imports of parts and components as well as the total imports of
machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) are taken from the UN COMTRADE database.
The data for the value added derives from the UN Industrial Statistic and WDI database.
Thus, the dependent variable used as a proxy for outsourcing, could be represented by one of
the following variables:
 IMVA = Ratio of imported parts and components to value added in transport and ma-
chinery
 SHAI = Market share of imports in parts and components
As we have seen in the theoretical part, we will consider the customization costs as explained
by the level of education and technology. We chose to represent the customization costs by
using the following variables: human capital and R&D. In relation to human capital we tried
di¤erent proxies such as public spending on education, school enrollment at the country
level (secondary and tertiary). Finally, we decided for school enrollment at the secondary
level (SESG), because it gives the better results. As a proxy for R&D we chose scientists and
engineers in R&D. All these data come from the World Development Indicators database.
The wage data comes from the ILO Statistic database. The statistic of wages are in general
average earning per workers. Earning data from payrolls of establishment usually refers to
cash payments received from employers before deduction of taxes and social security. The
wages considered are: wages in manufacturing. The thickness of the market was described as
the amount of listed companies in each countries. This variable was found in WDI database.
Finally, as a measure of the rule of law and corruption we used the index of the International
Country Risk Guide. The list of the independent variables is the following:
 Wage = Yearly wage per employee in manufacturing
 Pse = Public spending on education at the country level, total (%GDP), as a proxy for
human capital
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 Sesg = School enrolment at the country level, secondary (% gross), as a proxy for human
capital
 Scrd = Scientists and engineers in R&D at the country level (per million people), as a
proxy for R&D
 Thick = Total amount of rms in each east European country
 Rule of Law = The quality of the legal system in each east European country
To summarize, our log-log estimation is:
outi;t = + 1wi;t + 2psei;t + 3sesgi;t + 4seti;t + 5scrdi;t + 6thicki;t + 7rulei;t + "i;t;
where i stands for the i   th cross sectional unit (number of countries considered as partners)
and t for the time period.
1.5.3 Estimation Method
The regression model that we have used is a panel data regression model. We have decided
to use a panel data because we suspect heterogeneity in the di¤erent countries over time. But
also because by combining time series of cross section observations a panel data regression can
permit to have more information data, less collinearity among the independent variables and
more degrees of freedom.
We would like to see if imports in parts and components depends on R&D, education, wage,
rule of law and thick of the market, in the expected way. We have 9 cross sectional units
(in fact the time period is 1993-2001) and 11 countries, which means that we should have 99
observations. Unfortunately, as a consequence of the fact that some data are not available (rule
of law) we will work with 77 observations.
We estimate two possible proxies for outsourcing, each of them in relation to the four
di¤erent European countries that we take into consideration: Italy, Germany, France, UK. The
estimation that we take into consideration is SUR. For what concern the estimation technique
we have decided to consider the pooled regression. In this regression all coe¢cients are restricted
to be the same across all cross-sections, so this is equivalent to estimating a model on the stacked
data, ignoring all cross-sectional information. The estimated model assumes not only that the
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intercept value of each of the four country, Italy, Germany, France and UK, is the same among
the di¤erent years, but also that the slope coe¢cients of the independent variables is identical
for all the nine years. As a consequence of these restricted hypothesis, we will prefer to test
for pooling, in order to make sure that this kind of estimation is reasonable. The test that we
use is based on the F-statistic It consists in comparing the sum of squared residuals from the
restricted model with the one obtained from the unrestricted one. As the critical f is higher
than the f-statistic we cannot reject the null that slopes and intercepts are equal across the
nine years, so the restrictions seem to be appropriate. This also implies that we should pool
the data together.
Before moving to the estimation results, we have to check for heteroskedasticity. This
problem can arise as a consequence of the fact that we consider a large number of countries.
This heteroskedasticity problem is a result of the di¤erent sizes of the countries. In fact we
can expect to observe higher variation in the imports of parts and components coming from
large countries than in those coming from the small ones. And even if we consider countries
of similar sizes, the problem of heteroskedasticity can always exist as a consequence of the fact
that the amount of imports in parts and components also varies as a consequence of research
and development expenditure, spending in education. Nevertheless, if we implement the test
for groupwise heteroskedastic on the pooled regression, that is a test of equality of variance
among the di¤erent years, we will see that the test statistic cannot reject the null hypothesis of
equal variance of the residuals across years, so there is no evidence of the presence of groupwise
heteroskedasticity.
In conclusion, the type of estimation that we have chosen is a pool regression with SUR. The
characteristics of this estimation are the following. By selecting Seemingly Unrelated Regres-
sion, we estimate a feasible GLS specication correcting for both cross-section heteroskedastic-
ity and contemporaneous correlation. In the initial estimation, we considered all the indicated
regressors, but a problem of multicollinearity appeared. The reason is because the set of ex-
ogenous variables chosen is highly correlated. For this reason, we restricted the number of
regressors, keeping only the more signicant one. Hence the reduced form regression corrected
for multicollinearity is: outi;t = + 1wi;t + 2sesgi;t + 3scrdi;t + 4thicki;t + 5rulei;t + "i;t.
Moreover, we did an Hausmann test of endogeneity. The choice to implement a test statistic
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for endogeneity is because we are concerned in trying to understand if wage is endogenously
determined by the outsourcing. The reason of this test comes from the fact that one of the
result found by Grossman and Helpman is that the relative wage can be solved as a function of
the number of input supplier in each country. So it is endogenously determined by the amount
of outsourcing activities. If this were the case then OLS estimates will be biased and inconsis-
tent. To test this hypothesis, we have used a set of instrumental variables correlated with the
"suspect" variable wage but not with the error term of the outsourcing equation. As instru-
mental variables of the wage we have decided to consider pse, sesg and scrd. We run two OLS
regressions. In the rst regression, we regress the suspect variable, wage, on all exogenous vari-
ables and instruments. Subsequently, after having taken the residuals from this rst regression,
we create a second regression, in which we re-estimate the usual dependent variable including
the residuals from the rst regression as additional regressors. However, since the coe¢cient
on the rst stage residuals is not signicantly di¤erent from zero, we can conclude that OLS
estimates are consistent. Hence, there is no endogeneity problem. However, this results could
not be considered completely reliable. In fact, it could be that in implementing this test we
have not used all the possible variables supposed to explain wages.
1.5.4 Purpose of the Econometric Work
We are trying to study rms decisions about where to outsource. Since the availability of rm
level data is restricted, we based our analysis on aggregate data. We are conscious that this
choice makes the dependent variable an imperfect measure of outsourcing. The econometric
results should put in evidence the determinants of the location of part of the production process
in the eleven destination countries. We considered the time period 1993-2001, because the
empirical ndings in term of vertical disintegration start after 1990. Since we are not interested
in observing which of the eleven East and South European countries seems to become more
likely a partner of one of the four EU countries, we considered these eleven countries as an
aggregate area with which Italy, Germany, France and UK could start new trade relationships.
The question to which we are trying to answer is the East and South European countries
have become partners of an outsourcing relationship during 1993-2001?. Since the main Euro-
pean countries trade most of the time among each others, it could be interesting to understand
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whether the enlargement of the Europe would increase the incentive to nd outsourcing part-
ners in the new arrivals. The new European area will become a possible place in which rms in
countries such as Italy, UK, France and Germany, will decide to outsource a particular activity?
In trying to analyze this problem, we will adopt the theoretical results of the H-G model of
outsourcing.
The econometric results conrm the existence of a role played by the eleven destination
countries in supplying parts and components to the four EU countries. Nevertheless, this role
seems to be quite small, at least during the period 1993-2001.
1.6 Econometric Results
1.6.1 Econometric Results with IMVA
We will start by taking into consideration the estimation results for the ratio of import in
parts and components to value added in manufacturing. This dependent variable gives us the
amount of parts and components that explains the value added in manufacturing in each of
the four countries. We should remember that this amount of parts and components can be
considered a combination of outsourcing and intra-rm trade, as a consequence of the fact
that it is not possible to have data on outsourcing from an aggregate point of view. We
are estimating the relationship between the intensity of imports of parts and components in
manufacturing production and all the set of explanatory variables (customization costs, rule of
law and thickness of the market). The estimation results for each EU country are provided in
table 1, table 2, table 3 and table 4 in the Appendix. The estimation technique used is pooling
with SUR. In fact, after having implemented a test on pooling for each proxy of the dependent
variable and for each of the four countries, we can conclude that it is possible to pool. The
consequence of this choice is that all the coe¢cients are restricted to be the same across all
cross-sections, and this is equivalent to estimate a model in which we ignore the cross-section
information. We have decided to use a pool estimation with SUR because this kind of estimation
corrects for both cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. And even
if from the group-wise heteroskedasticity test there is no evidence of heteroskedasticity, there
could be some problems of autocorrelation.
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For what concern Italy, in the rst regression we consider the following explanatory variables:
wage, sesg, scrd, thick, rule of law. From the R2 we can say that the explanatory variables
explain around 26% of the total incentive to import parts and components from the eleven east
and south european countries. If we look to the sign of the estimated coe¢cients we can see
that wage is signicant and negatively related to IMVA, as expected . The coe¢cient of sesg,
that represents a proxy for human capital, contradicts our expectation, because it is negatively
related to the amount of imports, and it is statistical signicant. Whereas, the coe¢cient of
scrd, that is a proxy for R&D, is positive and statistical signicant. The coe¢cient associated
to the thickness of the market is signicant and positively related to the dependent variable.
Finally, the coe¢cient of the quality of the legal system is positive and statistically signicative.
To summarize, all the coe¢cients of the independent variables have the expected sign, except
for sesg.
If we consider the other three countries, Germany, France and UK we can see that we obtain
similar results. More precisely, the estimations results related to Germany in terms of sign and
signicance are more satisfactory with respect the one obtained for Italy. From the R 2^ we can
say that the explanatory variables explain around 50% of the total incentive to import parts
and components from the eleven east and south European countries. However, the coe¢cient
of sesg is negative and statistically signicant. Whereas, all the other coe¢cients are signicant
and they have the expected sign.
Frances estimation di¤er from the one of Germany only in terms of R 2^. For what concern
the sign and the statistical signicance of the coe¢cients we obtain exactly the same results as
the one obtained for Italy and Germany. For what concern UK the results little more changes.
In fact, the coe¢cient of wage changes sign passing from negative to positive, even if it is
not statistically signicant. Moreover, the coe¢cient of scrd becomes negative but it is not
statistical signicant.
For all the four countries the coe¢cients associated to rule of law and thickness of the
market are signicant and with the expected sign. This conrms the theoretical expectation.
In particular, holding all the other exogenous variables constant, an improvement by 1% in the
contracting environment in the eastern and southern economic area, raises the protability to
nal producers of searching there by 1.4%, 6.5%, 5% and 4% respectively for Italy, Germany,
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France and United Kingdom.
If we compare the magnitude of the coe¢cients among the four countries, we can conclude
that Germany and France have the highest value for the coe¢cients associated to rule of law,
thickness of the market and wage. Italy follows for what concern wage, and UK for the coef-
cient associated to rule of law. Germany and France seem to be the countries for which we
obtain the better results in term of correspondence with the theory suggested by H-G. Also
the results for Italy are robust, even if not so big in term of magnitude. Whereas, for UK we
have some contradictory results. The fact that Germany seems to be the country for which
we have the better results, could be explained by the fact that in Germany one of the most
important industry is the car industry. The latter has started in recent year to subcontracting
an ever expanding range of activities, so we were expecting to obtain no contradictory results
for Germany.
What can appear not reasonable is the sign that we obtain for the coe¢cient of sesg with
respect to each country. In fact, we expected a positive sign, as a consequence of the fact that
an increase in the school enrollment should decrease the customization costs of producing good
quality intermediate goods. What could be the reason? One justication could come from the
following consideration. The school enrollment (sesg) is strictly linked to the wage rate, in the
sense that an higher level of education will imply an higher wage rate. As we know, the wage
rate is expected to be negatively linked to the choice of outsourcing, so for the same reason we
could understand why the coe¢cient of sesg has a negative sign.
1.6.2 Econometric Results with SHAI
Now we take into consideration the estimation results for the market share of import in parts a
components. This dependent variable gives us the amount of import of parts and components
from each of the eleven countries in relation to the overall amount of imports of parts and
components for every year. We are estimating the amount of import from one of the eleven
country with respect the total amount imported from all the eleven. Again we are interested
in the relationship between SHAI and all the set of explanatory variables (customization costs,
rule of law and thickness of the market). The estimation results are provided in table 5, table
6, table 7 and table 8 in the Appendix, the estimation technique is pool with SUR.
27
For what concern Italy, in the rst regression we consider the following explanatory variables:
wage, sesg, scrd, thick, rule of law. From the R2 we can say that the explanatory variables
explain around 29% of the total incentive to import parts and components from the eleven east
and south European countries. If we look to the sign of the estimated coe¢cients we can see
that wage is signicant and negatively related to SHAI, as expected . Again the sesg, that
represents a proxy for human capital, is negatively related to the amount of imports, and it is
also statistical signicant. Whereas the other coe¢cients have the expected sign, exactly as in
the previous estimation.
By considering the other three countries, Germany, France and UK we obtain similar results
to the one obtained with the previous dependent variable, IMVA. The main changes concern
the R2. For what concern UK the results have more changes. In fact, not only the wage is
positively related to IMVA, even if not statistically signicant, but here also scrd is negative
and statistical signicant. Again for all the four countries the coe¢cients associated to rule of
law and thickness of the market are signicant and with the expected sign.
By comparing the magnitude of the coe¢cients among the four countries, we can conclude
exactly what we have concluded before. Germany and France have the highest value for the
coe¢cients associated to rule of law, thickness of the market and wage. Italy follows for what
concern wage, and UK for the coe¢cient associated to rule of law. Germany seems to be
the country for which we obtain the better results in term of correspondence with the theory
suggested by H-G. Also the results for Italy are robust, even if not so big in term of magnitude.
Whereas, for UK we have some contradictory results. The fact that Germany continues to be
the country for which we have the better results, seems to conrm the empirical evidence.
It is important to point out that by considering two di¤erent and imperfect measures of
outsourcing we have obtained approximately the same results, both in terms of magnitude that
in terms of sign, for each of the four EU countries. This could be considered an important
results
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1.7 Conclusions
The rise of outsourcing as a new method of production raises important issues about the political
consequences of the on going fragmentation of the production, and about what drives this
process of fragmentation. We have discussed the model developed by Grossman-Helpman for
studying outsourcing decisions in a global economy. We have considered the nal producers
problem of obtaining the essential component from a possible partner.
In the econometric part of the present paper we have tried to estimate the relationship
between the imported parts and components and several country characteristics: the wage level
in the manufacturing sector, investment in human capital and R&D, the quality of the legal
system and the thickness of the market. Finally, after having tested the choice of where to
outsource by considering di¤erent possible elements that seem to a¤ect outsourcing, our main
conclusion is that the quality of the legal system can be considered a relevant variable, that can
increase the countrys ability to take part to the international outsourcing process. In general,
we can say that from the estimated regressions we obtain results consistent with the theory.
In order to have a full understanding of the nature and determinants of outsourcing, or
more generally of production sharing, it seems necessary move the attention away from data at
aggregate level. The reason is the bias that characterizes the work at the aggregate level: it is
impossible to distinguish between outsourcing and FDI. Consequently, a further step in trying
to analyze the empirical nature of the outsourcing phenomenon is using data at rm-specic
levels. Moreover, we can also try to extend the range of possible countries, by including a larger
set of transition economies.
Finally, since the present empirical research has paid a special attention to the inuence of
the roles of institutions on outsourcing decisions, one possible further step is try to consider other
proxies of the quality of institutions, in such a way to avoid some problems, such as endogeneity5.
In fact, most studies that employ institutional indicators try to consider indicators from more
than one data source, in order to test the robustness of the results. In our case, another possible
index that can be included is the Corruption Perception Index. However, it can be very di¢cult
obtain these institutional data for certain countries, that have been characterized by political
5The ratings of rule of law and corruption indicators follow economic changes. This implies that, when a
country is characterized by a rapid economic growth this will determine a rapid increase of these indices.
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instability.
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A.1 Appendix
Estimation results with IparImva
ITALY (with sesg and scrd)
Dependent Variable: LOG(IPARMVA)
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Sample: 1 11
Included observations: 9
Number of cross-sections used: 9
Total panel (balanced) observations: 81
One-step weighting matrix
Variable Coefficient
C 1,3421***
(0,1172)
LOG(WAGE) -0,1174***
(0,0084)
LOG(SESG) -3,1555***
(0,0311)
LOG(SCRD) 0,7557***
(0,0072)
LOG(THICK) 0,2727***
(0,0025)
LOG(RULEOFLAW) 1,4301***
(0,0266)
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.2641
Adjusted R-squared 0.2151
S.E. of regression 1.2099
Durbin-Watson stat 1.5199
Standard errors are in parenthesis. In each table *, ** and *** mean signicance at the 10,
5 and 1% level respectively.
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FRANCE (with sesg)
Dependent Variable: LOG(IPARMVA)
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Sample: 1 11
Included observations: 9
Number of cross-sections used: 9
Total panel (balanced) observations: 81
One-step weighting matrix
Variable Coefficient
C 0.5731
(1,9126)
LOG(WAGE) -0,4471***
(0,0885)
LOG(SESG) -3,8875***
(0,3766)
LOG(SCRD) 0,5798***
(0,0751)
LOG(THICK) 0,7144***
(0,0279)
LOG(RULEOFLAW) 5,0944***
(0,3496)
Weighted Statistics
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.3453
Adjusted R-squared 0.3017
S.E. of regression 1.7759
Durbin-Watson stat 1.4825
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GERMANY (with sesg and scrd)
Dependent Variable: LOG(IPARMVA)
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 08/26/04   Time: 19:22
Sample: 1 11
Included observations: 9
Number of cross-sections used: 9
Total panel (balanced) observations: 81
One-step weighting matrix
Variable Coefficient
C -2.0251
(1,2630)
LOG(WAGE) -0,4736***
(0,0874)
LOG(SESG) -3,9017***
(0,3549)
LOG(SCRD) 0,9160***
(0,0718)
LOG(THICK) 0,6748***
(0,0394)
LOG(RULEOFLAW) 6,5240***
(0,5719)
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.5079
Adjusted R-squared 0.4751
S.E. of regression 1.6474
Durbin-Watson stat 1.9365
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UK (with sesg)
Dependent Variable: LOG(IPARMVA)
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 08/26/04   Time: 20:00
Sample: 1 11
Included observations: 9
Number of cross-sections used: 9
Total panel (balanced) observations: 81
One-step weighting matrix
Variable Coefficient
C 1.0099
(3,3503)
LOG(WAGE) 0.2118
(0,1665)
LOG(SESG) -3,5752***
(0,7122)
LOG(SCRD) -0.1296
(0,1784)
LOG(THICK) 0,4488***
(0,04967)
LOG(RULEOFLAW) 3,8688***
(0,4172)
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.2057
Adjusted R-squared 0.1527
S.E. of regression 1.6398
Durbin-Watson stat 1.5489
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Estimation results with Shae:
ITALY (with sesg and scrd)
Dependent Variable: LOG(SHAI)
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Date: 08/26/04   Time: 19:11
Sample: 1 11
Included observations: 9
Number of cross-sections used: 9
Total panel (balanced) observations: 81
One-step weighting matrix
Variable Coefficient
C 3,7656**
(1,7017)
LOG(WAGE) -0,3181***
(0,0864)
LOG(SESG) -2,6686***
(0,3795)
LOG(SCRD) 0,3565***
(0,0682)
LOG(THICK) 0,2004***
(0,0216)
LOG(RULEOFLAW) 2,7419***
(0,3157)
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.2952
Adjusted R-squared 0.2482
S.E. of regression 1.139
Durbin-Watson stat 1.5566
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GERMANY (with sesg and scrd)
Dependent Variable: LOG(SHAE)
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Sample: 1 11
Included observations: 9
Number of cross-sections used: 9
Total panel (balanced) observations: 81
One-step weighting matrix
Variable Coefficient
C -2.1556
(2,3167)
LOG(WAGE) -0,3722**
(0,1417)
LOG(SESG) -3,4973***
(0,6229)
LOG(SCRD) 0,6874***
(0,1176)
LOG(THICK) 0,4443***
(0,0559)
LOG(RULEOFLAW) 6,7152***
(0,8307)
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.4123
Adjusted R-squared 0.3732
S.E. of regression 1.7635
Durbin-Watson stat 1.9314
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FRANCE (with sesg)
Dependent Variable: LOG(SHAE)
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Sample: 1 11
Included observations: 9
Number of cross-sections used: 9
Total panel (balanced) observations: 81
One-step weighting matrix
Variable Coefficient
C 10,391***
(1,2926)
LOG(WAGE) -0,7841***
(0,0908)
LOG(SESG) -5,4652***
(0,4586)
LOG(SCRD) 0,3224***
(0,1219)
LOG(THICK) 0,4928***
(0,0317)
LOG(RULEOFLAW) 7,7533***
(0,2929)
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.4042
Adjusted R-squared 0.3645
S.E. of regression 1.5226
Durbin-Watson stat 1.491
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UK (with sesg)
Dependent Variable: LOG(SHAE)
Method: Seemingly Unrelated Regression
Sample: 1 11
Included observations: 9
Number of cross-sections used: 9
Total panel (balanced) observations: 81
One-step weighting matrix
Variable Coefficient
C 8,0298***
(2,5587)
LOG(WAGE) -0.0954
(0,1326)
LOG(SESG) -3,6291***
(0,4015)
LOG(SCRD) -0,4155***
(0,1169)
LOG(THICK) 0,3681***
(0,0446)
LOG(RULEOFLAW) 4,3678***
(0,4710)
Unweighted Statistics
R-squared 0.1914
Adjusted R-squared 0.1374
S.E. of regression 1.5567
Durbin-Watson stat 1.5631
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Chapter 2
FDI versus Exports: What Role is
Played by Asymmetric
Liberalization?
2.1 Introduction
MNEs together with their subsidiaries are responsible for 75 percent of the worlds trade com-
modity. This trend is conrmed by UNCTADs report (2000) where is estimated that one third
of world trade is intra-rm trade (trade between headquarters of MNEs and subsidiaries, or
simply among subsidiaries). Given the importance of understanding the functioning of MNEs,
the recent literature is not only interested in studying the determinants of rms choice to be-
come multinational; but also in observing the di¤erent integration strategies of MNEs; and put
them in comparison with other type of rms that can serve foreign markets. More precisely,
recent researches are oriented towards the di¤erent ways of foreign market access.
Many empirical micro based studies, that observe production and trade at the rm level,
have demonstrated the existence of di¤erent type of rms even within industries. This het-
erogeneity plays a peculiar role in the recent trade literature. If on one side, the new trade
theory predicted either that all rms export or that none do depending upon the level of trade
costs, on the other side the so called new new trade theory gives rise to a more di¤erentiated
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framework, in which each rm that enters the market has innate ability. This ability would
determine whether the rm becomes a pure domestic rm, an exporter or a MNF. The decision
to engage in exporting or in FDI activities is highly connected with rm characteristics, like
dimension, productivity, factor intensity. This conrm the existence of a link between trade
and rms heterogeneity.
In the present study we consider an economy with 3 countries, each with a di¤erent trade
policy. Following the seminal paper of Melitz, we study the e¤ect of trade on the reallocation
of resources, in a contest where rms could also engage in horizontal FDI activities. In this
framework, where we allow for asymmetric trade costs, we analyze the e¤ect of changes in trade
policy barriers on di¤erent type of rms. The new asymmetry introduced gives raise to new
interesting insights in terms of preferential trade agreements. Moreover, the existence of a third
type of rms implies a modication of the concept of producers and sellers in an open economy
situation.
In this work the claim is that the choice of becoming an exporter or engaging in FDI is
linked to di¤erent countries locations, and so to di¤erent transport costs. These new elements
could permit to analyze a richer set of possible results. In this paper, Melitz adds two essential
elements to the new trade theory. The rst is the xed market entry costs, that is what a
potential entrant has to pay. The second is heterogeneity in rms productivity. By introducing
rms heterogeneity in the 1980s Krugman model, he observed how an increase in the exposure
to trade lead to reallocation towards the more e¢cient rms, without necessarily inducing an
increase in the productive e¢ciency of individual rms1. Its ndings are supported by several
micro-econometric studies.
After this paper, the study of the implications of rm level productivity di¤erences has
become an important eld of interest in international economics. In fact, the shift from the
representative rm framework to the heterogeneous rms framework allowed to model some
aspects of international commerce that until now have been studied only empirically. We are
referring to the di¤erent production strategies that a rm can undertake. Which rm serves
foreign market? Which rm chooses to export, which to serve the foreign market through FDI?
1This result is partially contradicted by Baldwin et all (2004), where they pointed out that "although freer
trade improves industry productivity in a level sense, it harms it in a growth sense"
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And nally, what are the circumstances under which it outsources? These questions can be
addressed because of this new heterogeneity element inserted. The novelty in this contest, is
that only a fraction of rms will become exporters or engage in FDI. Hence, allowing rms level
productivity to di¤er has generated a new area of research where trade is combined with the
di¤erent organizational choices of rms. In this contest, the di¤erent production strategies can
be analyzed in a general equilibrium setting.
In line with this new research area is the paper by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004),
"Exports vs FDI". Here, the authors built a multi-country, multi-sectoral general equilibrium
model where their intent is to analyze the decision of heterogeneous rms to serve foreign market
either through exports or local sales (FDI). Similar to Melitz (2003), they work with identical
nations, a single factor, L, but with H+1 sectors. They nd that rm level heterogeneity
plays a relevant role in explaining the choice between export and FDI ows. Their theoretical
framework takes as a starting point the classical Melitzs model where another type of rm,
MNEs, is added. They studied the Brainards proximity concentration hypothesis2 in a rms
heterogeneity environment. Essentially, what they nd is that the least productive rms (with
a very high marginal cost, a is in between aD and a0) leavethemarket,astheyarenotable
toobtain positiveoperatingprot.Thelow productivityrms,aX < a < aD,enterbutserve
exclusivelythedomesticmarket.Thermswitha marginalcostsuchthataM < a < aX decide
toexport. And nallythemoreproductiverms,0 < a < aM,choosetoservetheforeign
marketthroughFDI.
a0adaxamb0
Theyassumethatthedi¤erentmodesofmarketaccessinvolvedi¤erentkind ofcosts.For
example,someentry costs,thatareconsidered sunk;then transportcosts,thatvary with
sales;and xed organizationalcostswhichvarywithorganizationalform.Themain resultof
2theproximityconcentration trade-o¤ predictsthat"rmsaremorelikelytoexpand theirproduction hori-
zontallyacrossbordersthehigherarethetransportcostsand tradebarriersand thelowerareinvestmentbarriers
and thesizeofscaleeconomiesatthelevelattheplantlevelrelativetotherm level"(Brainard,1997).
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their paper derives from the assumption of rms heterogeneity: by making rms characteristics
endogenous they avoid the classical result where either all the rms invest abroad or none does.
On the contrary, here there will be a range of rms that do export and another that engage in
FDI. Nonetheless, their results rely on the assumption of perfectly symmetric countries and on
the absence of asymmetries in transport costs or in xed costs. As a consequence of this a rm
that does export toward a country will do export towards every other country. This could limit
our comprehension about the reality, where usually a rm chooses a mixture of organizational
forms.
Up until now we considered studies that explained the di¤erent modes of foreign market
access by considering only nal goods. Nevertheless, the last two decades has been characterized
by a progressive disintegration of the production process, in which manufacturing or services
goods realized home could be combined with those done abroad. W hat does this imply?That
intermediate goods cross borders several time during the manufacturing process. This explains
why they have become the new actors of international trade. There are many examples that
can highlight this trend. The most quoted is the Barbie doll example cited by Feenstra (1998):
"Of the $2 export value for the dolls when they leave Hong Kong for the United States, about
35cents covers Chinese labor, 65cents covers the cost of materials, and the remainder covers
transportation and overhead, including prots earned in Hong Kong". However, the empirical
evidence quantifying this phenomenon is not so developed. One reason relies on the way in which
data on intermediate goods are collected. In fact, the classication of goods into intermediate
and nal is quite arbitrary. In order to turn aside from this arbitrariness, Hummels, Ishii and Yi
(2001) used a narrower concept of fragmentation of production: imported goods used as inputs
to produce a countrys export goods. They found that international trade in intermediate rose
faster than in nal goods. Despite the interest for the empirical analysis of the di¤erent form
of production processes, we choose to leave that aside for the moment and continue to focus on
the theoretical aspects of this new new trade.
If we want to understand the nature of trade in intermediate goods, we should spend some
words in describing the ways in which this trade can happen. On one hand, a rm can decide
to produce an intermediate input within its boundaries; in this case it engages in what the
literature calls vertical FDI. On the other hand, a rm can decide to outsource the production of
44
the intermediate input. This would imply that some sectors could have only vertical integrated
rms and others have only disintegrated rms. These two ways of international procurement
of intermediate goods could be better explained by adding to the trade theory some elements
of contract theory. In relation to this could be useful to consider the large literature on the
organizational forms of the rm. It starts with the seminal paper by Coase (1937), later
developed by Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Grossman and Helpman.
The latter paper considers the choice between integration and outsourcing in a framework
where all the rms are equally productive. Instead, the recent paper by Antras and Helpman
(2004) studies the problem of choosing di¤erent ownership structure by introducing in the G-H
model di¤erent productivity levels. These studies make contract theory very important for
analyzing situations in which rms heterogeneity is linked with ownership structure.
Building on this literature, we would like to develop a theoretical model where we study
the e¤ects of within sectoral heterogeneity on the decision of rms to engage in foreign market
access, in a framework where distance plays a role. Following HMY, we would like to add to this
model intra-rm trade: each good sold requires a component that is shipped from the mother
nation and a component that is produced locally. This would imply that the total marginal
cost of selling via FDI will rise with distance, as a consequence of the fact that the transfer
of this component incurs in transport costs. In this contest, distance will not only discourage
exports but eventually also FDI, permitting us to obtain mixed results. For example a rm
can decide to do FDI until a point and then when transport costs become to high (in relation
to the fact that the marginal cost of being engaged in FDI is already higher than the cost of
doing export), it switches to export strategies. M oreover, we could also analyze this framework
from a di¤erent perspective. In particular, we can ask: what is the prot maximizing way for
rms to organize their activities? Do rms prefer internally produce the intermediate inputs or
to outsource to some local supplier? In order to deal with this issue we will make use of some
elements of some contract theory. This idea is developed in more details in section three .
This paper condenses di¤erent research interests, and it is organized in the following way.
In section 2.2 we develop the model of trade with asymmetric trade costs. In section 2.3 we
characterize its equilibrium of this economy. In section 2.4 we investigate the impact asymmetric
liberalization. In the last section we conclude.
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2.2 A model of trade with asymmetric trade costs
The present model builds on Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2004) (HMY hereafter),which in turn
builds on Melitz (2003)3. We consider three countries, A, B and C that use labor to produce
goods. The distance between A and B is su¢ciently small. C represents the remote country,
also in terms of culture. In every country there is a homogeneous and a di¤erentiated sector that
produces respectively good z and x. As in Helpman et al (2004) we assume that a fraction of
income, , is spent on the di¤erentiated good, and a fraction (1 ) is spent on the homogeneous
good, z. The latter is taken as numeraire. In every country there are Li units of labor. As the
labor-input coe¢cient for the homogeneous sector is 1 and given the fact that the homogeneous
good is produced in every countries, the wage is equalized across countries. In particular,
the common wage rate is equal one. For what concerns the di¤erentiated sector, as usual we
assume increasing return to scale in the production of each variety (monopolistic competition
environment). As there are no costs of product di¤erentiation, each rm will produce only one
variety.
To enter in an industry rms bear the xed cost fE (measured in units of labor), that
is sunk. Subsequently, the entrant draws a productivity parameter (or labor per unit output
coe¢cient, called a) from a common cumulative density function G(a)4. However, the trun-
cated distribution, G(a=aDi); is di¤erent for each country. Upon drawing its own productivity
parameter, a rm can immediately decide to exit and not to produce (this happens if it has
a low productivity draw). Otherwise, a rm can choose to produce; this will imply additional
xed costs linked to the type of organizational form chosen. If it chooses to produce for its own
domestic market it pays the additional xed market entry cost fD. If the rm chooses to export,
it bears the additional costs fX of meeting di¤erent market specic standards (for example, the
cost of creating a distribution network in a new country). Finally, if the rm chooses to serve
through FDI, the additional costs it has to face are fM . The latter xed cost is due to creating
a distribution network in a new country as well as to the building up of new capacities in the
foreign country. This implies that fM is composed by fD and fX
5. More precisely, in order
3 In order to preserve consistency, we will follow the Helpman et al notations.
4The support of the continuous random variable a is 0  a  a0
5fD ,fX , fM can be considered as variety development costs or xed organizational costs.
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to obtain this partition is essential that fD <
" 1fX < fM ; otherwise we lose the relationship
between productivity level and type of market access. Following Melitz we assume that a rm
who wishes to export or engage in FDI should make an initial investment. This latter occurs
when the rms productivity is already revealed.
As it is clear from the inequality above, the exporting sector is characterized by iceberg
transport costs: selling one unit in the export market, would require the shipment of   1
units. In relation to the countrys location we will observe the following iceberg costs:
AB < AC
CB < CA
These assumptions would have an implication on the productivity level that we should ob-
serve. As  a¤ects only exporting sector, the productivity required for becoming an exporter is
increasing with distance. This implies that the number of exporters will be decreasing with dis-
tance. After entry the market environment is characterized by monopolistic competition. Last
element: all rms face a constant probability of death. This event is described by a Poisson
distribution with an hazard rate 6 : in every period the rm can be hit by this bad event and
forced to exit. Hence, each rms value prot is:
v(a) =
1X
t=0
(1  )t(a) =
1

(a)
hence, the actual value of prots does not depend upon . For simplicity, we assume that there
is no time discounting.
Preferences
Preferences are described by the utility function :
U = z(1 )
Z
v2V
x(v)
 

dv
6As Melitz pointed out, the probability of exit  introduces an e¤ect similar to time discounting.
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Consumers have identical, homothetic preferences over the two classes of goods. Furthermore,
consumers have identical preferences among varieties. Preferences across varieties have the
classical CES form. Hence, if we take the log the sub-utility function over all varieties of good
x is:
u =


log
Z
v2V
x(v)

dv
where  represent the elasticity of substitution,  = " 1
"
: The solution to the utility maximiza-
tion problem7 gives us the usual demand for each variety:
x =
Ei
niZ
0
pi(v)1 "dv
p "i
= Aip "i
where Ai = E
i
nZ
0
pi(v)1 "dv
.
Production and Trade
On the rm side, there is a continuum of rms, each will choose to produce its own varieties.
The partial derivative of the prot equation gives the price at which the di¤erentiated good is
sold. More precisely:
@
@q
(pq  aqw   fw) = 0
this gives a consumer price of pi =
aw

, where i = A; B or C . The term 1

in the price
expression, represents the mark up factor8. This is the price o¤ered by a domestic producer
or by a foreign subsidiary. Whereas, the consumer price for the imported goods is pj =
waij

where j = A;B; C: In what follow we will set w equals to 1. Firms technology is characterized
by a constant marginal cost with a xed specic cost. The cost function is: li = f + aq.
After entry, a rm will know its own productivity. Subsequently, it will decide whether
7The budget constraint is: Ei =
Z
v2Vh
p(v)x(v)dv
8Giving the relationship between  and ", we have that: 1

= "
" 1
:
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serve exclusively the domestic market, or if engaging also in foreign market access. In this
latter case rm can choose two channels: exports or local sales via a¢liate production (FDI).
This choice is a¤ected by the proximity concentration trade-o¤: FDI requires higher xed costs
(for building up new capacities), but it saves transport costs. Lets have a look to the di¤erent
operating prots. Please note that i 6= j:
The operating prots from producing for domestic market are
iD = pq   aq   fD
and then,
a1 "Di
(1  )Ei
1 "
niZ
0
pi(v)1 "dv
= fD
where aDi is the cut-o¤ marginal cost for entering the domestic market; E
i is the expen-
diture on the di¤erentiated good;  is the probability of death of each rm;
niZ
0
pi(v)1 "dv is
the price integral over all the competing varieties. In autarky, this term can be rewritten as
nEi
aDiZ
0
 
a

1 "
dG(ai): Later on, the 
1 " will be put outside the integral, so as to get rid o¤ it.
Using previously mentioned simplication, the above expression can be written as:
a1 "Di
(1  )Ai
1 "
= fD
moreover, by setting (1 )A
i
1 "
= Bi, we obtain
a1 "Di B
i = fD (2.1)
Lets consider the operating prot from exporting in country j (here the quantity supplied
di¤ers from above because of Ej ):
ijX = pjqj   aqj   fX
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and then,
ija
1 "
Xij
(1  )Ej
1 "
nZ
0
pj(v)1 "dv
= fX
where aXij is the cut-o¤ marginal cost for entering the export market
9; ij represents the
"freeness" of trade, ij  
1 "
ij
10. As ij will be di¤erent for each pair of countries, there will
exists three type of trade openness. The above equation can be rewritten as11,
ija
1 "
XijB
j = fX (2.2)
Finally the operating prots from doing FDI in country j are:
ijM = p
jqj   aqj   fM
and then,
a1 "Mij
(1  )Ej
1 "
nZ
0
pj(v)1 "dv
= fM
where aMij represents the cut-o¤ marginal cost for engaging in FDI activities in market j. As
only horizontal FDI are taken into consideration, FDI activities do not incur in transport costs.
Hence,
a1 "MijB
j = fM (2.3)
However, for what concern the rms engaged in FDI, the operating prot taken into consid-
eration involves the comparison between the operating prots form FDI activities and ex-
port activities. This because a rm will choose to engage in FDI in country j if only if
9 i and j represent the origin and the destination country respectively.
10 It goes from 0 (autarky,  =1) to one (trade is perfectly free,  = 1).
11where Aj = E
j
nZ
0
pj(v)1 "dv
and Bj = (1 )A
j
1 "
.
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Mij   Xij  fM   fX . It follows that the operating prots would be
a1 "MijB
j(1  ij)  fM   fX
Note that Ei and Ej represent the income level in the origin and in the destination country
respectively. Since the only source of income is labor income, E = wL, and as we set w = 1,
E = L. As mentioned above, aDi, aXij and aMij represent the cut-o¤ marginal costs for entering
the domestic market, the foreign market as exporter or as subsidiary. In particular, as we are
dealing with three asymmetric countries we will have fteen cuto¤s. As we are allowing for
countries asymmetries, the minimum level of productivity in order to produce the di¤erentiated
good, 1
aDi
, is di¤erent in every country; as well as the productivity level required for becoming
an exporter or for engaging in horizontal FDI. Since 1
a
represents the labor productivity and " is
set to be strictly greater than 1, a1 " could be considered a productivity index. All the prots
described above are increasing function of 1
a
. Independently on the type of activity, the more
productive is a rm, the more prots it will make. A rm with a productivity index below 1
aDi
will exit the industry because its operating prots are less than 0. a1 " represents the cut-o¤
productivity level at which a particular type of rm just break even.
From the operating prots above we can derive the cut-o¤ coe¢cients:
aDi =

fD
Bi
 1
1 "
aXij =

fX
Bjij
 1
1 "
aMij =

(fM   fX)
Bj(1  ij)
 1
1 "
N-types, D-types, X-types and M-types
As it is clear from above, rms are distinguished into four groups. Firms that do not produce
at all, a > aD; rms that sell domestically, aD  a > 0; rms that sell domestically and
also export, aX  a > aM ; nally rms that sell domestically and build subsidiary in foreign
country, aM  a > 0. These types are determined by the existence of three di¤erent xed
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organizational costs, discussed previously. This explain the three cuto¤ levels, i.e. thresholds
for marginal costs: aD, aX and aM . Figure a) can be useful.
Firms draw from the marginal cost distribution G(a), where a is the marginal costs, con-
sidered as the continuos random variable; n represents the mass of rms with any given level
of "a". Hence nG(a) represents the steady state distribution of a. Through n we can calculate
the mass of rms existing in each category.
2.2.1 Characteristic of the Open Economy
Price Index
The price index di¤ers from the one in a symmetric world. Here, it is a¤ected by di¤erence in
productivity between rms and thus by their di¤erent prices and quantities. The price index
in country i is determined by combining the consumer price of the varieties produced by the
domestic country, plus the consumer price of the varieties that reach country i through foreign
subsidiaries or through export12. Hence:
nZ
0
pi(v)1 "dv = nEi
aDiZ
0
 a

1 "
dG(a=aDi)+
+
X
j 6=i
nEj
2
64
aMjiZ
0
 a

1 "
dG(a=aDj) +
aXjiZ
aMji
ij
 a

1 "
dG(a=aDj)
3
75
As previously said, it could be convenient to put the 1 " outside the integral;this will allow
us to do some simplications.Hence,
nZ
0
pi(v)1 "dv =
nE
i
1 "
aDiZ
0
(a)1 "dG(a=aDi)
| {z }
+
12The price indexis multiplied by n, because it is necessary to consider all the possible type ofrms that can
enter in the economy given the probability ofsuccesfull entrance.
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11 "
X
j 6=i
nEj
2
64
aMjiZ
0
(a)1 " dG(a=aDj) +
aX jiZ
aMji
ij (a)
1 " dG(a=aDj)
3
75
where dG(a=aDi) represents the probability of being a particular type of rm (domestic, exporter
or subsidiary)conditional on the probability of successful entry. Note that the rst integral
includes all the varieties produced in the domestic market, the second and the third integral
represent all varieties sold by foreign subsidiaries and imported from the other markets. Thus,
the price index could be thought as a weighted average of the marginal costs of all rms active
as sellers in country i. nEi is the mass of varieties produced in country i.
The Free Entry Conditions
Every rm has to pay fE to enter in the market. It can happen that some rms after having
paid fE draw a marginal cost higher than the maximum marginal cost necessary for breakeven
in the domestic market, a > aD. Such rms will immediately exit form the market, loosing their
fE . In the other case, when a < aD, the potential entrant will survive and eventually serve other
markets as exporter or subsidiary. The reward obtained after a successful entry increases as the
mass of active rms decreases. This result is similar to the Dixit-Stiglitzmodel. However, here
the equilibrium number of rms is more complicated than in the homogeneous case, because of
the di¤erent type of rms that can enter.
The free entry condition ensures equality between the expected rm prots of a potential
entrant and the entry cost fE . If this prot is negative no rms would enter the sector. Despite
the fact that we are in a frameworkof monopolistic competition, among the rms that enter
there will be some that loose with respect to the average prots:when their pure prots are
exactly equal to their xed organizational costs, they cannot repay fE . W hereas, rms that have
a pure prots strictly greater than the xed cost, they can repay the initial sunkcost. These
last rms earn pure prots:their revenues exceeds their costs by more than what would be
necessary to cover the sunkcosts. the unrestricted entry condition will imply that the expected
prot is driven to zero. Using the initial operating prots, the equilibrium free entry condition
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in country i of a potential entrant is:
aDiZ
0
(a1 "
(1  )Ei
1 "
nZ
0
pi(v)1 "dv
  fD)dG(a) +
X
j 6=i
[
aijZ
aMij
(ija
1 " (1  )E
j
1 "
njZ
0
pj(v)1 "dv
  fX)dG(a)+
+
aMijZ
0
(a1 "
(1  )Ej
1 "
njZ
0
pj(v)1 "dv
  fM )dG(a)] = fE
We can rewrite the equation above in order to have a more tractable expression.
aDiZ
0
(a1 "Bi   fD)dG(a) +
X
j 6=i
nEj [
aXijZ
aMij
(a1 "(ijB
j)  fX)dG(a)+
aMijZ
0
(a1 "(Bj)  fM )dG(a)] = fE (2.4)
Parametrization: Pareto Distribution
The free entry condition and the price index depend upon probability distribution. This implies
that if we want an explicit solution for them we need to assume a particular functional form for
G(a). Following the empirical literature on rms size distribution it seems reasonable to use as
an approximation the Pareto distribution with lower productivity bound 1
aDi
. The cumulative
distribution function of a Pareto random variable a is:
G(a) =

a
a0
k
(2.5)
where k and a0 are the shape and scale parameter, respectively. Note that k=1 implies a
uniform distribution on [0;a0]. The shape parameter k represents the dispersion of cost draws.
An increase in k would imply an increase in the number of high cost rms (the shape of
the cumulative distribution becomes more convex). The support of the distribution, 0::::a0,
is identical for every country. a0 represents the upper bound of this distribution. In order
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to avoid innite variance we should consider an upper bound on the highest possible level of
productivity, or a minimum value for the marginal cost. Figure 1 in the Appendix describe the
marginal cost that is induced by G(a). The productivity distribution of surviving rms will
also be Pareto with shape k; and the truncated cost distribution is given by:
G(a=aD) =

a
aD
k
with a 2 [0; aD].
Price Index with Pareto distribution
The price index in country i is characterized by all the brands o¤ered in that country. M ore
precisely, the brands o¤ered by domestic rms and foreign subsidiaries have a consumer price
of a=, and brands o¤ered by foreign exporters have a consumer price of aij=. As rms will
start producing only if they have at least a productivity of 1
aDi
, the probability distribution of
being an exporter (or FDI) is conditioned on the probability of successful entry: G(a=aDi)
13.
Please note that the upper bound of the cost distribution so that rms survive, aDi, is di¤erent
for every country. We describe the price index for each country. Hence, the price index in A is:
nZ
0
pA(v)1 "dv =
nEA
1 "
aDAZ
0
(a)1 " dG(a=aDA)+
nEB
1 "
2
4aMBAZ
0
(a)1 " dG(a=aDB) +
aXBAZ
aMBA
AB (a)
1 " dG(a=aDB)
3
5+
nEC
1 "
2
4aMCAZ
0
(a)1 " dG(a=aDC) +
aXCAZ
aMCA
AC (a)
1 " dG(a=aDC)
3
5
where we use dG(a=aDi) =
ak 1
(aDi)
k
14, where we exploit the fractal nature of the Pareto distribu-
tion. Then solving the integral we obtain,
nZ
0
pA(v)1 "dv =
nA
1 "akDA
k
k   "+ 1
ak "+1DA +
nB
1 "akDB
k
k   "+ 1
h
ak "+1MBA + AB

ak "+1XBA   a
k "+1
MBA
i
13 It is exploited the fractal nature of the Pareto.
14G(a=aDi)=
G(a)
G(aD)
=

a
a0

k

a
aDi

k
=

a
aDi
k
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+
nC
1 "akDC
k
k   "+ 1
h
ak "+1MCA + AC

ak "+1XCA   a
k "+1
MCA
i
 A
where ij = (
ij)1 ". Whereas in country B the price index is:
nZ
0
pB(v)1 "dv = nEB
aDBZ
0
 a

1 "
dG(a=aDB)+nA
2
4aMBAZ
0
 a

1 "
dG(a=aDA) +
aXBAZ
aMBA
AB
 a

1 "
dG(a=aDA)
3
5
(2.6)
+nEC
2
4aMBCZ
0
 a

1 "
dG(a=aDC) +
aXBCZ
aMBC
BC
 a

1 "
dG(a=aDC)
3
5
solving the integral,
nZ
0
pB(v)1 "dv =
nB
1 "
k
k   "+ 1
a1 "DB +
nA
1 "akDA
k
k   "+ 1
h
ak "+1MAB + AB

ak "+1XAB   a
k "+1
MAB
i
+
nC
1 "akDC
k
k   "+ 1
h
ak "+1MCB + BC

ak "+1XCB   a
k "+1
MCB
i
 B
Finally, the price index in country C is:
nZ
0
pC(v)1 "dv =
nC
1 "
k
k   "+ 1
a1 "DC +
nA
1 "akDA
k
k   "+ 1
h
ak "+1MAC + AC

ak "+1XAC   a
k "+1
MAC
i
+
nB
1 "akDB
k
k   "+ 1
h
ak "+1MBC + BC

ak "+1XBC   a
k "+1
MBC
i
 C (2.7)
Free entry condition using the Pareto distribution:
Also the free entry is rewritten in order to consider the Pareto parametrization assumed above.
We should keep in mind that the free entry condition includes all types of rms. This implies
that the cumulative density function is G(a) =

a
a0
k
; hence the support is: 0:::: a0, where for
simplicity we can set a0 = 1: The free entry condition in country A would be:
aMABZ
0

a1 "
EB
"B
  fM

dG(a)+
aXABZ
aMAB

a1 "
EB
"B
BA   fX

dG(a)+
aMACZ
0

a1 "
EC
"C
  fM

dG(a)
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+aXACZ
aMAC

a1 "
EC
"C
CA   fX

dG(a) +
aDZ
0

a1 "
EA
"A
  fD

dG(a) = fE
As we can see two elements that compose the free entry are: (1) the ex ante expected xed
costs and (2) the expected benets. In general terms,
X
j 6=i
[
aMijZ
0

a1 "
Ej
"j
  fM

dG(a) +
aXijZ
aMij

a1 "
Ej
"j
BA   fX

dG(a)+
aDiZ
0

a1 "
Ei
"i
  fD

dG(a) = fE
where i is the index for the home country, whereas j indexes the two foreign countries. i is
the price index in the home country and j is the price index in the foreign countries:
2.3 General Equilibrium with Asymmetric Trade Costs
We now examine the equilibrium in this special asymmetric model. More precisely, we observe
the impact of a gradual trade openness in this special trade bloc composed by three countries,
previously described. In absence of trade barriers, every country will replicate the outcome
of the integrated world economy. In fact, rms act as if they were selling their variety to the
integrated world economy; and consumers in every country can buy the same goods at the same
aggregate price index. In this contest trade will have the same e¤ect as an increase in country
size in a closed economy. This implies that the rm level outcome is not a¤ected. As precised
by Melitz 2003, the transition to trade does not a¤ect the rm level variables (productivity,
prots). Hence, Krugman 1980is conrmed.
It seems more plausible that rms wishing to export or to engage in FDI activities are not
only a¤ected by per unit costs (such as transport costs), but also by some xed costs, that
are not linked with export or FDI volumes. These additional specic xed costs could explain
the partition among domestic, exporting and FDI rms. In relation to the exporting sector,
Tybout and Roberts (1997) provided evidence about xed costs associated with entry into
export markets: a rm should learn about the host market, and provide information about the
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product characteristics to consumers in that market (we will denote these costs of distribution
and servicing network, fX). Similar costs could be thought for FDI sector. However, these
costs include not only the previously mentioned costs of distribution and servicing network, but
also the cost of building up new capacities (subsidiaries) and the cost of duplicating overhead
production (these costs are denoted fM ); hence fM > fX . Both types of costs could be modelled
as independent of quantity decisions. Regardless of the organizational type of rm, a rm incurs
in the same sunk cost of entry, fE . As we assume that the variation in country size is small
enough (at the beginning we consider identical countries), the homogeneous good is produced
in every country so that FPE across country is ensured.
Firms who decide to export have to realize the initial xed investment of fX ; however this
xed investment occurs only after the rms productivity is known. Moreover, exporting rms
should face the standard per-unit trade costs:  > 1 units of a good must be shipped in order
for one unit to arrive at destination. In this special case, the trade costs, even if they are the
same for every pair of countries, i.e. AB = BA, they could di¤er between pair of countries,
i.e. AB 6= AC : The model is solved considering that country C has the highest barriers to
trade. For this reason is possible to use the following relationship:
AC  BC < AB
We could think to country A and B as two closed areas, like European and Eastern European
countries. Country C could represent another important economic area with which A and B
are trading.
Even if the countries are not perfectly symmetric, as trade costs di¤er between pair of
countries, these di¤erences are small enough to preserve FPE: the wage rate is the same in
every country; and it is normalized to one. The existence of di¤erent openness to trade however,
would imply di¤erent price index in every country. In fact, the price index is determined by
the aggregate number of goods available in every country, that in turn depends upon the trade
costs. In the domestic market, the rm pricing rule is given by pd =
aw

= a

. Firms who
export will use another pricing rule: they set higher prices in the host economy that reects
the increased marginal costs of serving this market, px =
a

= pd. On the contrary the price
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sets by subsidiary is always a domestic price (however the cuto¤ productivity level is di¤erent
in every country). Each rms prot could be a combination of portions earned from domestic
sales, export sales and a¢liate sales. Precisely, the combined revenue of a rm is:
r (a) =
rd (a) if the rm serves only the domestic market
rd (a) +
X
j 6=i
rxj (a) if the rm exports to all countries
rd (a) +
X
j 6=i
rm j (a) if the rm engages in FDI in all countries
In order to obtain the special partition that we want it is necessary and su¢cient that fD
< " 1fX < fM : the FDI costs must be higher than the trade costs, and these latter have to be
bigger than the domestic costs. Without this relationship, no level of trade costs  , can induce
this partitioning. All the xed costs coe¢cients are assumed to be the same across countries;
Even if the cumulative distribution is the same in every country, the equilibrium cuto¤s will
be di¤erent in every country. To be precise, the existence of asymmetries implies the existence
of fteen operating prots conditions and three free entry conditions. The highly non linearity
of this system derives from the following term: k   " + 1. As mentioned in HMY, k > " + 1,
so that nite variance of the distribution is ensured. However, since we have to simplify the
system in order to obtain an analytical solution, the values chosen for these parameters cannot
respect this condition. This gives raise to the following question: could it be possible to justify
the existence of heavy tailed distribution with innite variance? The answer is yes, so long as
an upper bound on the highest possible level of productivity is assumed. If not, then the rms
with those unbounded (high) productivity levels take over the entire market (hence the innite
variance). 1=amin plays the role of upper bound. Hence, in terms of marginal costs a should
belong to the following interval: a 2 [amin; a0] ; where amin< a0.
The equilibrium cuto¤s and number of rms are found solving a system of eighteen equa-
tions, where we consider di¤erent degrees of trade openness.
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2.3.1 Transition from Autarky to Trade
In the autarky situation the number of rms in every country can be simply obtained by using
the price index inside the operating prot of the domestic rm, this gives:
ni =
(1  )Ei
kfD
(k   "+ 1)
Subsequently, substituting the equilibrium number of rms into the free entry condition, we can
nd an expression for the equilibrium level of domestic cuto¤. The export and FDI activities
do not exist in this situation. Respecting the previous assumptions, if trade is allowed, new
types of rms will emerge: in relation to their productivity drawn, each rm could give birth
to a di¤erent organizational scenario.
In the Melitz model the FE condition is identical in both closed and open economy15. In the
present framework, we start with the analysis of the symmetric case, in which every country
open to trade. The FE conditions are equal to the same fE . Again, these FE are left una¤ected
by trade: regardless of prot di¤erences across rms (relative to export or FDI status), the
expected value of future prots, in equilibrium, must equal the xed investment cost fE (sunk
cost). Hence, as in Melitz 2003, the transition from autarky to open economy, will move up
the ZCP curve: the exposure to trade induces an increase in the cuto¤ productivity level
(

1
aD
T
>

1
aD
A
)16. This will modify the productivity level of the least productive rms. In
an open economy situation, a rm with a productivity level between

1
aD
A
and

1
aD
T
cannot
earn positive prots and so will exit from the market. Moreover, as pointed out by Melitz,
another selection process acts: rms with productivity level above

1
aX

or above and

1
aM

enter respectively as exporters or as subsidiary. These three e¤ects are called domestic market
selection e¤ect, export market selection e¤ect and FDImarket selection e¤ect. These e¤ects
reallocate market shares towards more e¢cient rms, and generate an increase in the overall
productivity.
The transition toward the open economy situation generates a reduction in the number
of rms operating in every country17. The equilibrium number of rms in each country will
15Melitz 2003 considers perfectly symmetric countries with identical trade costs.
16Recall that the ZPC are downward sloping and the FE conditions are upward sloping.
17As in Melitz, M < MA, where MA represents the number of rms in autarky.
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represent the total number of rms selling in that country: total number of domestics rms,
foreign exporters and multinationals. The number of rms decrease as a consequence of the
domestic market selection e¤ect (aD #). However, as the entrance of new foreign rms more
than compensate this reduction, consumers typically enjoy a larger amount of varieties.
2.4 E¤ect of Asymmetric Liberalization
Partial Integration between A and C
As in this work we enlarge the analysis to three countries, we could exploit the rich set of
insights deriving from the analysis of an asymmetric liberalization. In fact, when all countries
are symmetric is not possible to consider the e¤ect of a countrys position within the trade
network considered. On the contrary, if we allow trade barriers to di¤er across countries, so
that they are pair-wise symmetric, it is possible to consider the e¤ect of preferential trade
liberalization. These asymmetries induces important changes in the steady state equilibrium.
We solve the system for a certain level of integration between A and B and B and C.
Whereas, A and C represent two symmetric regions with an undened level of integration; AC
is left undened so that it is possible to analyze the e¤ect of a gradual liberalization between
A and C. B represents the asymmetric region. In fact, as very few country can operate in an
autarky environment, it seems more interesting to observe whether an increase in the exposure
to trade, or an increase in the level of integration, will generate similar e¤ects as the one
previously discovered for the transition from autarky to free trade. In what follows is assumed
that the increase in the level of integration is the result of a reduction in trade costs,  (or " ),
generated from a bilateral agreement between A and C to decrease barriers to trade.
As described in the section above the result of the transition from autarky to trade was an
increase in the aggregate productivity and in welfare as a consequence of a market selection
e¤ect. Below it will be shown how preferential trade liberalization, occurring through reduction
in trade costs, could generate interesting changes in the equilibrium results: the equilibrium
cuto¤ ( in terms of marginal costs) is decreasing in the liberalizing countries, whereas is increas-
ing in the third countries. In the liberalizing countries, the least productive rms will exit from
the market, and the market share is reallocated from the less productive to the more produc-
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tive. The asymmetric liberalization considered would permit to observe changes in extensive
and intensive margins.
The model is calibrated so that to respect the di¤erent assumptions made in the theoretical
part, and keeping only the parameter AC undened. In this section we examine the e¤ects
of a transition from very low integration to a partially integrated situation between country A
and C. The analyses is meant to observe the impact of a progressive integration between A
and C on the cuto¤s equilibrium levels and on the number of rms in each country (so on the
initial steady state). In this situation the price index in A and C will be exactly the same, as
well as the FE condition and the cuto¤ operating prots. The system in 18 equations reveals
the existence of multiple equilibria. We decide to consider the rst solution because is the more
plausible: it is highly stable with respect to the others. This equilibrium determines fteen
cuto¤s and three equilibrium number of rms. However as A and C are identical, they share
the same cuto¤s and the same number of rms, so it is su¢cient to compare A to B. The
introduction of asymmetries at the country level permits the emergence of new insights. What
are the e¤ects of gradual integration between A and C on rms productivity levels? Do all
rms benet from partial integration or the impact depend on rms productivity? How the
number of entrants, producers and exporters is a¤ected? How is aggregate productivity and
welfare a¤ected?
Optimal Cuto¤ Levels
The increase in AC
18 induces a decrease in the domestic marginal cost of A=C (see graph
below), indicating an increase in the cuto¤ productivity level of domestic rm,

1
aD
0
>

1
aD

:
(2.8)
18This relation is respected: AC  BC < AB
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This is what Melitz denes the domestic market selection e¤ect : the increasing liberalization
between A and C increase the cuto¤ productivity level of domestic rms in these countries. On
the other hand, the domestic marginal cost of B is slightly increasing with AC . The increase
in the level of integration between A and C reduces the level of competition in B, so that the
productivity required to survive in this market is lower:
(2.9)
As we can observe from the graphs, the initial level of marginal cost is higher in A and C than
in B, indicating that in countries A and C the cuto¤ productivity level is lower. The reason of
this lower level of productivity derives from the smaller level of competition existing in these
two markets, A and C, before liberalization. The export cuto¤ productivity levels, 1
aXAB
and
1
aXAC
, are decreasing with AC , as expected:
(2.10)
The graph above tells us that an increase in AC determines an increase in the marginal cost
of exporting toward B and C. The partial integration between A and C reduces the level of
productivity required to become exporter in C. This happens because on one side the increased
exposure to trade forces the least productive rms to exit, but it will also generate the entry
of new rms into the export market (that did not export with a lower level of AC). For the
same reason there is a decrease in the level of productivity required to become exporter in B.
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Again from the graph we notice that the marginal costs for being exporter in C is lower than for
country B: since trade costs are higher toward C than B the productivity required for reaching
country C as exporter should be higher.
What about the cuto¤s equilibrium level for rms engaged in FDI? The marginal cost of
doing FDI is higher in country C than in country B, indicating that the level of productivity
required to reach country B is higher than to reach C, 1
aMAB
> 1
aMAC
. This result depends
upon the fact that as FDI activity is not a¤ected by trade costs, it became easier to engage
in FDI activity the more distant is the country19. Let observe the graphical representation of
aMAB < aMAC :
How can we explain these behaviors? Simply by considering the evolution of AC . In fact, the
increase in AC makes
1
aMAC
increasing because now is easier to reach market C through exports
(as the transport costs have decreased). This will increase the productivity level required
for being a subsidiary in C so that this condition is respected: MAC   XAC  fM   fX
(selection e¤ect: as a consequence of liberalization only the more productive rms will survive
as subsidiaries in C ). On the other side, there is a slight increase in the marginal cost aMAB;
what does kit represent? The e¤ect of an increase in the level of integration between A and C
reduces competition in the country una¤ected by trade liberalization. Hence, as the subsidiary
rms are in some sense domestic, the productivity required to be subsidiary in B decrease
slightly. This could be also a reect of what is happening in the FDI sector from A toward C.
In country B the marginal cost of exporting, aXBA, is slightly decreasing as a consequence
of an increase in AC (and as a consequence of the symmetry between A and C, aXBA = aXBC .
19Recall that the choice of engaging in FDI activity is determined by: Mij   Xij  fM   fX
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So the productivity is decreasing with integration, " 1
aXBA
= 1
aXBC
.
This happens because some rms from A and C will enter as exporters in the new markets A
or C. Firms that from country B wants to become exporters in A or C should face this new
competition: as a consequence of increase in AC , more rms are entering in markets A and C
as exporters, and the country excluded form the integration, B, will pay in terms of a required
productivity level. There is a market selection e¤ect on the exporter rms that form B enter in
A or C. The same is true for the productivity level required to engage in FDI activity for country
Bs rms. As a consequence of partial liberalization between A and C there is an increase in
the equilibrium productivity level (these are the same in A and C, so 1
aMBA
= 1
aMBC
):
The decrease in trade costs makes harder to do FDI for country B, because export is become
more accessible as a consequence of  #. The increase in the productivity level makes entrance
more attractive.
Hence, for what concern A and C, the gradual liberalization between them forces the least
productive rms to exit (e¤ect on the marginal cost of domestic rms), but it also generate
the entry of new rms into the export market (who were unable to export with a lower AC).
The opposite happens in country B: the reduction in trade costs between A and C induces an
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increase in the productivity level required to become an exporter from country B; the marginal
costs of domestic rms increases slightly. All the changes lead to a symmetric world.
For rms in country A (C), the increase in AC makes easier to become exporter in country
B and C (A). The higher integration between A and C, due to a reduction of trade costs,
generates an increase in the domestic cuto¤ productivity, but a decrease in the export cuto¤
productivity. As in Melitz the increased exposure to trade forces the least productive rms
to exit, but the decrease in  permit the entry of new rms into the export market. On the
other side, it makes easier to become MNF in B and more di¢cult in C. The condition on the
operating prots of MNFs is more restrictive as AB is decreasing. Whereas, as country B does
not experiment an increase in trade openness, in the MNFs sector there is not an increase in
competition. For rms in B, the increase in AC makes more di¢cult to become an exporter or
a MNF in countries A and C. In fact, with respect to a situation in which B was the only trading
with both A and C, the partial integration between A and C increase the level of competition
that Bs rms should face when they reach the foreign countries. In countries A and C there is
a domestic market selection e¤ect induced by openness to trade; whereas in country B the e¤ect
of increase in AC reduces the overall prots in this economy, so the zero cuto¤ prot condition
moves up generating a reduction in the productivity required for entering successfully.
Number of Entrants, Producers and Exporters
As it is clear from above, rms are distinguished into four groups. Firms that do not produce
at all, a > aD;rms that sell domestically, aD  a > 0;rms that sell domestically and
also export, aX  a > aM;nallyrms that sell domesticallyand build subsidiary in foreign
country, aM  a > 0. These types are determined by the existence of three di¤erent xed
organizational costs, discussed previously. This explain the three cuto¤ levels in each country,
i.e. thresholds for marginal costs:aD, aX and aM . Figure a)can be useful. Firms draw from
the marginal cost distribution G(a), where a is the marginal costs, considered as the continuos
random variable;n represents the mass of rms with any given level of "a". Hence nG(a)
represents the steadystate distribution of a. Through n20 we can calculate the mass of rms
existing in each category.
20
n is a primitive number that indicates everytype of rm entering in the market.
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In a contest of heterogeneous rms, preferential trade agreement would have a richer impact
on the number of rms in each country. The partial integration between countries A and C
induces a reduction in the number of rms with any given a, this means that
@nE
i
@AC
< 0 in each
country. Thus the overall amount of entrants in the trade bloc decreases:
This means that preferential trade agreements reduces the number of patterns which have been
drawn in every country. As we described above, from nEi we could derive the di¤erent type of
rms existing in each country. In the excluded country, B, the preferential trade liberalization
between A and C, is increasing the number of active rm, and reducing the number of entrants
as exporters and MNFs. On the contrary, in the liberalizing countries, there is a reduction in
the number of active rm. This e¤ect is combined with an increase in the number of entrants as
exporters and MNFs towards B, and with a reduction with respect to country C. The number
of active rms in each country is given by
n
Active
i = ni

aDi
a0
k
where a0 is set to be equal 1. In the liberalizing countries the number of active rms is
decreasing,
@nActive
i
@AC
< 0, and so the number of domestic varieties; this is due to the so called
domestic market selection e¤ect : the increase in competition between A and C reduces the
number of active rms. On the other side the partial liberalization increases the number of
rms that are entering as N-type rms21. This latter e¤ect could be due to the increased
competition. In the excluded country, B, it is observed a slight increase in the number of active
21Firms that enters but do not produce.
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rms,
@nActive
i
@AC
> 0, associated with a decrease in the number of N-type rms. This last e¤ect
could be explained by the reduction in the level of competition.
The number of sellers in county i includes domestic producers, exporters from j 6= i and
foreign subsidiaries. From the mass of potential entrants nEi , we could obtain the amount
of domestic producers, nEi G(aDi), exporters selling in i, n
E
j G(aXji) and subsidiaries selling
in i, nEj G(aMji). So that n
E
i G(aDi) +
P
j 6=i
nEj G(aXji) +
P
j 6=i
nEj G(aMji) = n
s
i , total amount of
rms selling in country i. On the other side the number of producers in country i is given by
nEi G(aDi) +
P
j 6=i
nEj G(aMji). As a consequence of PTA, the number of sellers is decreasing in
countries A and C, whereas it is increasing in country B. The same is happening to the number
of producers.
Is it possible to interpret the behavior of the equilibrium number of entrants, nEi , in terms
of the "home market e¤ect"?Krugman (1980) identied in the home market e¤ect the peculiar
distinction between traditional trade and new economic geography. He showed that in a two
industry economy with one factor of production, each country will tend to export those products
for which it has a relative large domestic demand. In our case the preferential trade liberalization
is decreasing the domestic marginal costs of production in the liberalizing countries, implying
an increase in demand of domestically produced varieties. In line with the home market e¤ect,
this generates an increase in the number of rms engaged in foreign market activities. On
the contrary, since the excluded country is facing a decrease in the domestic demand, as a
consequence of the increased domestic marginal costs, the number of rms engaged in foreign
market activities is reduced.
First we calculate the number of exporters and MNFs with a low level of integration: AC =
0:3:Subsequently, we observe what happens for further increase in liberalization, AC = 0:6:
This would permit to obtain variations in the total level of export. As we know, these changes
will derive from changes in the extensive and intensive margin (new products exported and
increased exports in products already traded, respectively). In country B, the increase in AC
implies an augment in the number of pure domestic rms (aDB has increased), and an increase
the number of foreign subsidiaries. As a consequence, the number of pure domestic varieties
decreases, because the labor resources has to be shared among di¤erent type of producers. As
in Melitz, the increases liberalization between A and C, reducing aDA = aDC ; reduces the
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number of domestic varieties. However, the reduction in trade costs generates an increase in
the exported varieties that reach country A. Finally, on one side we assist to an increase in the
varieties sold by subsidiaries from country B, but on the other side we observe a decrease for
what concerns C. To conclude, the overall amount of varieties exported has increased as e¤ect of
integration, and the overall number of varieties produced by MNFs decreased. Intuitively this
happens because integration, as implies the reduction in trade costs, encourages the exporting
sector.
E¤ects of PTA
The e¤ects of preferential liberalization in a model with three asymmetric countries, in terms
of trade barriers, are important in terms of new patterns of entry across countries. In the
liberalizing countries, A and C, where the domestic cuto¤s reduction implies higher productivity,
is more di¢cult to enter as local supplier; although becomes easier for the successful entrants
rms to engage in foreign market activities. In these countries there will be a decline in the
average price and costs. On the contrary, the excluded country, B, experiments an increase
in the cuto¤, which makes entrance in the local market easier. However, PTA is discouraging
rms decisions to sell abroad, both as exporters than subsidiaries.
The liberalizing countries get better access as exporters to each others market and also
to the excluded one. For what concern the FDI sector, the liberalizing countries, A and C,
become more selective in terms of respective MNFsentry, as a consequence of increase in trade
openness. However, it becomes easier for them to enter as a subsidiary in the third country.
The excluded country will experiment a reduction in market access to A and C, both in terms
of exporting and subsiadiaries rms. Hence, preferential trade liberalization generate a welfare
gains in the liberalizing countries, A and C, along with a reduction in welfare for the excluded
country, C.
2.4.1 PTA and Change in TotalExport
International trade evolves along two major margins: intensive and extensive margins. The
intensive margin represents a movement of world trade determined by variations in trade volume
among pre-existing rms. On the other hand, the extensive margin refers to movement of world
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trade due to new trade relationships being established or existing ones abandoned. These
two aspects of trade represent an interesting novelty in the empirical literature. The analysis
of extensive and intensive margin permits to consider the action of time. This represents
an important change with respect to the typical approach used in gravity studies, where the
attention was circumscribed to those country pairs with strictly positive trade ows.
Since many ndings conrm that trade relationships are inuenced by extensive-margin
adjustments both in terms of the number of new exported products and the number of exported
products, in the present work we examine the e¤ects of preferential trade liberalization on these
two margins. Our results seem to conrm the empirical ndings related to the greater reaction
of the extensive margin to distance (expressed as trade barriers) with respect to the intensive
margin. In what follow we derive the expression of these two measures of trade. The value of
export of a is exporting rm is given by:
a1 "ijEB
"j
(2.11)
but we should remember that the export cuto¤ condition is
ija
1 "
Xij
Ej
"j
= fX
ijE
j
j
=
"fX
a1 "Xij
(2.12)
substituting equation(2) inside equation(1) we obtain the per rm level of export
v(a) =

a
aXij
1 "
fX
If we integrate over all the exporting rms we obtain the total value of export:
ni
aXijZ
aM ij
"
a
aXij
1 "
fX
#
dG(a)
The intensive margin of trade refers to increased exports of products already being exported,
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hence:
Int. Marg.=
2664
a0XijZ
a0
Mij

V [a; 0; n0]  V [a;0; n0
	
dG(a)
3775
where a0Xij and a
0
Mij represent the cuto¤ equilibrium level at ij = 0:3. Since ni changes
as a consequence of increased level of integration, in the intensive margin formula ni is not
taken into consideration. In fact, ni represents the number of entrants, which will be lower
as a consequence of the market selection e¤ect, even if it includes new exported varieties (the
number of exporters has increased). Since we want a measure of di¤erences in volume of already
exported varieties we do not consider ni.
The extensive margin refers to exports of products that have been not exported before, as
a consequence of the entry of new rms. In order to calculate this measure we evaluate a in
the per rm level of export considering the two di¤erent level of integrations: ij = 0:3 and
0ij = 0:5:
Ext. Marg.=
a0XijZ
a0
Xij
V [a; 0; n0]dG(a)
Change in Total Export from country A to B and C
Lets consider the changes in total export for the liberalizing countries, A and C. Both the
intensive than the extensive margin are positive. As expected the extensive margin is higher
with respect to both partners. As consequence of partial trade liberalization, the change in
total export between A and C is positive and again the extensive margin plays a more signicant
role.
Change in Total Export from country B to A
As consequence of partial trade liberalization between A and C, the change in total export
between B and A is negative. Here the negative role played by the extensive margin is bigger
than the role played by intensive margin. The same is true with respect to country C.
The overall change in total export of the entire economy is positive.
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2.4.2 PTA and Change in Total FDI
 Tot Exp =
a0XijZ
a0
Mij

V [a; 0; n0]  V [a;0; n0
	
dG(a) + (n0:5exp  n
0:3
exp)
a0XijZ
a0
Xij
V [a; 0; n0]dG(a)
2.5 Conclusions
In this paper we developed a model of international trade with asymmetries in terms of trade
costs. W e consider one di¤erentiated sector, x, characterized by rms with di¤erent produc-
tivities. The existence of di¤erent xed costs generates the possibility of observing di¤erent
organizational forms. Moreover, the existence of di¤erent trade costs allows a more detailed
analyses of the impact of trade, in particular with respect to preferential trade agreement.
The e¤ects of preferential liberalization is such that in the liberalizing countries, A and C,
is more di¢cult to enter as local supplier; although becomes easier for the successful entrants
rms to engage in foreign market activities. In these countries there will be a decline in the
average price and costs. On the contrary, the excluded country, B, experiments an increase
in the cuto¤, which makes entrance in the local market easier. However, PTA is discouraging
rms decisions to sell abroad, both as exporters than subsidiaries. Moreover, the liberalizing
countries get better access as exporters to each others market and also to the excluded one.
For what concern the FDI sector, the liberalizing countries, A and C, become more selective in
terms of respective MNFs entry, as a consequence of increase in trade openness.
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Chapter 3
FDI and Exports with Intermediate
goods and coordination costs
3.1 Introduction
In 1993 Brainard proposed what has become the standard approach for explaining horizontal
multinational rms, the so called proximity versus concentration hypothesis. This hypothesis
put in evidence the trade-o¤ between the advantages from locating near to customers and from
concentrating production in only one location (that gives rise to scale economies at the plant
level). This model obviously implies that it is more likely to be engaged in FDI activities when
trade costs are particularly high. Hence, foreign subsidiaries sales will be raising with distance.
For the same reason, horizontal FDI are not encouraged by reduction in transport costs. On
the contrary, when trade costs fall, scale economies advantages can outweight the gain from
locating near to customers. In this case export activities could become more protable. If we
compare this theory with what the empirical evidence on FDI tells us, we would immediately
discover some discrepancies.
Since 1986, despite the drastic reduction in transport costs across di¤erent countries, there
has been a consistent growth of multinational sales, in particular of FDI inows. As Dun-
ning 1993 showed, a large part of international trade is conducted by MNEs. He estimated
that MNEs together with their subsidiaries are responsible for 75 percent of the worlds trade
commodity. Conrming this trend, UNCTAD (2000) estimated that one third of world trade
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is intra-rm trade (trade between headquarters of MNEs and subsidiaries, or simply among
subsidiaries). These empirical ndings seem to contradict our expectations based on proximity
versus concentration hypothesis. Following the theory, the fall in trade costs should reduce
FDI and encourage exports. However, what the reality indicates is exactly the opposite: the
reduction in trade costs coincided with FDI growth1.
How could be possible to reconcile the MNFs theory with these ndings? An important
element that could be introduced is the existence of vertical linkages between the home and
the foreign nations. These linkages could be taken into account allowing intermediate inputs
to play a role. In what follows we argue that these inputs are supplied by two type of workers:
li and hi (i indicates the country). L
i represents the amount of low skill workers and Hi the
amount of high skill workers. If on one side low skill labor is perfectly substitutable, on the
other side, high skill is assumed to be rm specic. These input characteristics will make the
foreign a¢liates sales a¤ected by changes in distance trade costs.
The analysis focuses on the choice between FDI and Exports in a framework which includes
intermediate inputs. For this purpose, Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2004) and Antras-Helpman
(2004) will be intensively used. However, an interesting distinction is introduced: we allow for
asymmetries across countries. These asymmetries are expressed in terms of di¤erent country
location and so di¤erent trade costs (this would imply that productivities will be not only rms
specic, but also country specic). This element introduces a new level of heterogeneity, not
only among rms, but also among countries. On one side, this higher level of heterogeneity
contributes in keeping the analysis nearer to reality. In fact, conversely to the symmetric
assumption in HMY, which yields an equilibrium where if a rm can engage in foreign market
activity it will be active in every foreign market2 independently of the distance, the introduction
of spatial distribution of rms gives a role to distance in determining the organizational form of
rms. This is in line with the recent empirical ndings that seem to conrm that the number
of rms is decreasing with distance. In fact, spatial distribution of a¢liates seems to be much
richer than the scale-vs-proximity models predict.
Letting the production of the nal good variety requires a particular input combination
1This seems to be conrmed in EU, where under the single market situation a reduction in the trade costs
have been achieved.
2 In relation to its own productivity, it will be active as an exporters or as a subsisdiary.
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between high skill and low skill workers, will play an interesting role in an open economy
situation, when we analyze the organizational choices in the di¤erentiated sector. In particular,
when we consider the FDI strategies. In this contest, a subsidiary built abroad has to import
from the home nation the high skill service. This vertical linkage makes a portion of the total
marginal costs of selling via FDI rising with distance. Moreover, we argue that the relationship
between home and foreign nations gives rise to communication issues. In fact, in order to realize
the nal good, the subsidiary needs also the knowledge of the high skill workers in the home
nation. The transfer of this know how generates what could be called communication costs
(f(dist)). In this framework with intermediate inputs and communication costs, rms prefer
to engage in exporting rather than FDI strategies when distance becomes important.
As it was briey mentioned above a crucial paper in this respect is "The Impact of Trade
on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity" by Melitz (2002). This
paper adds two crucial elements to the new trade theory. The rst is the xed market entry
costs, that is what a potential entrant has to pay. The second is heterogeneity in rms produc-
tivity. By introducing rms heterogeneity in the 1980s Krugman model, he observed how an
increase in the exposure to trade lead to reallocation towards the more e¢cient rms, without
necessarily inducing an increase in the productive e¢ciency of individual rms3. Its ndings
are supported by several micro-econometric studies.
After this paper, the study of the implications of rm level productivity di¤erences has
become an important eld of interest in international economics. In fact, the shift from the
representative rm framework to the heterogeneous rms framework allowed to model some
aspects of international commerce that until now have been studied only empirically. We are
referring to the di¤erent production strategies that a rm can undertake. Which rm serves
foreign market? Which rm chooses to export, which to serve the foreign market through FDI?
And nally, what are the circumstances under which it outsources? These questions can be
addressed because of this new heterogeneity element inserted. The novelty in this contest, is
that only a fraction of rms will become exporters or engage in FDI. Hence, allowing rms level
productivity to di¤er has generated a new area of research where trade is combined with the
3This result is partially contradicted by Baldwin et all (2004), where they pointed out that "although freer
trade improves industry productivity in a level sense, it harms it in a growth sense"
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di¤erent organizational choices of rms. In this contest, the di¤erent production strategies can
be analyzed in a general equilibrium setting.
In line with this new research area is the paper by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004),
"Exports vs FDI". Here, the authors built a multi-country, multi-sectoral general equilibrium
model where their intent is to analyze the decision of heterogeneous rms to serve foreign market
either through exports or local sales (FDI). Similar to Melitz (2002), they work with identical
nations, a single factor, L, but with H+1 sectors. They nd that rm level heterogeneity
plays a relevant role in explaining the choice between export and FDI ows. Their theoretical
framework takes as a starting point the classical Melitzs model where another type of rm,
MNEs, is added. They studied the Brainards proximity concentration hypothesis4 in a rms
heterogeneity environment. Essentially, what they nd is that the least productive rms (with
a very high marginal cost, aD < a < a0) leave the market, as they are not able to obtain
positive operating prot. The low productivity rms, aX < a < aD, enter but serve exclusively
the domestic market. The rms with a marginal cost such that aM < a < aX decide to export.
And nally the more productive rms, 0 < a < aM , choose to serve the foreign market through
FDI. They assume that the di¤erent modes of market access involve di¤erent kind of costs.
For example, some entry costs, that are considered sunk; then transport costs, that vary with
sales; and xed organizational costs which vary with organizational form. The main result of
their paper derives from the assumption of rms heterogeneity: by making rms characteristics
endogenous they avoid the classical result where either all the rms invest abroad or none does.
On the contrary, here there will be a range of rms that do export and another that engage in
FDI. Nonetheless, their results rely on the assumption of perfectly symmetric countries and on
the absence of asymmetries in transport costs or in xed costs. As a consequence of this a rm
that does export toward a country will do export towards every other country. This could limit
our comprehension about the reality, where usually a rm chooses a mixture of organizational
forms.
Up until now we considered studies that explained the di¤erent modes of foreign market ac-
cess by considering only nal goods. Nevertheless, the last two decades have been characterized
4 the proximity concentration trade-o¤ predicts that "rms are more likely to expand their production hori-
zontally across borders the higher are the transport costs and trade barriers and the lower are investment barriers
and the size of scale economies at the level at the plant level relative to the rm level" (Brainard, 1997).
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by a progressive disintegration of the production process, in which manufacturing or services
goods realized home could be combined with those done abroad. What does this imply? That
intermediate goods cross borders several time during the manufacturing process. This explains
why they have become the new actors of international trade. There are many examples that
can highlight this trend. The most quoted is the Barbie doll example cited by Feenstra (1998):
"Of the $2 export value for the dolls when they leave Hong Kong for the United States, about
35 cents covers Chinese labor, 65 cents covers the cost of materials, and the remainder covers
transportation and overhead, including prots earned in Hong Kong". However, the empirical
evidence quantifying this phenomenon is not so developed. One reason relies on the way in
which data on intermediate goods are collected. In fact, the classication of goods into inter-
mediate and nal is quite arbitrary. In order to turn aside from this arbitrariness, Hummels,
Ishii and Yi (2001) used a narrower concept of fragmentation of production: imported goods
used as inputs to produce a countrys export goods. They found that international trade in
intermediate rose faster than in nal goods. Despite the interest for the empirical analysis of
the di¤erent form of production processes, we choose to leave that aside for the moment and
continue to focus on the theoretical aspects of this new new trade.
If we want to understand the nature of trade in intermediate goods, we should spend some
words in describing the ways in which this trade can happen. On one hand, a rm can decide
to produce an intermediate input within its boundaries; in this case it engages in what the
literature calls vertical FDI. On the other hand, a rm can decide to outsource the production of
the intermediate input. This would imply that some sectors could have only vertical integrated
rms and others have only disintegrated rms. These two ways of international procurement
of intermediate goods could be better explained by adding to the trade theory some elements
of contract theory. In relation to this could be useful to consider the large literature on the
organizational forms of the rm. It starts with the seminal paper by Coase (1937), later
developed by Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Grossman and Helpman.
The latter paper considers the choice between integration and outsourcing in a framework
where all the rms are equally productive. Instead, the recent paper by Antras and Helpman
(2004) studies the problem of choosing di¤erent ownership structure by introducing in the G-H
model di¤erent productivity levels. These studies make contract theory very important for
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analyzing situations in which rms heterogeneity is linked with ownership structure.
Building on this literature, our purpose is to develop a theoretical model where we study
the e¤ects of within sectoral heterogeneity on the decision of rms to engage in foreign market
access, in a framework where distance plays a role. Starting from Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2004) we propose to add to this model intra-rm trade: each good sold requires a component
that is shipped from the mother nation and a component that is produced locally. This would
imply that the total marginal cost of selling via FDI will rise with distance, as a consequence of
the fact that the transfer of this component incurs in transport costs. In this contest, distance
will not only discourage exports but eventually also FDI, permitting us to obtain mixed results.
For example, a rm can decide to do FDI until a point and then when transport costs become
to high (in relation to the fact that the marginal cost of being engaged in FDI is already
higher than the cost of doing export), it switches to export strategies. Moreover, we could
also analyze this framework from a di¤erent perspective. In particular, we can ask: what is
the prot maximizing way for rms to organize their activities? Do rms prefer internally
produce the intermediate inputs or to outsource to some local supplier? A further extension
of the present work could be to introduce some elements of contract theory in the contest of
outsouring relationships. This idea will be developed in more details in another paper.
This paper condenses di¤erent research interests, and it is organized in the following way.
In section 3.2 we elaborate the model and characterize its equilibrium. Section 3.3 investigates
the impact of trade. In section 3.4 we consider the e¤ects of progressive liberalization. In the
last section we conclude.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
We consider N5 symmetric countries, that use two inputs to produce goods. Consumers in each
country share the same preferences. Each countrys location is represented by a point on a circle;
along this circle, each country would have a clone. Trade costs among countries increase with
distance by a proportion . This would permit us to consider the role of asymmetric transport
costs, which are assumed to be pair wise symmetric, in the trade bloc (the circle). These
5Where N is assumed to be an odd number.
82
transport costs are broadly dened, so as to include di¤erent kind of impediments: distance,
trade barriers, cultural di¤erences. In every country there is a homogeneous and a di¤erentiated
sector that produces respectively good z and x. As in Helpman et al (2004) we assume that a
fraction of income, , is spent on the di¤erentiated good, x, and a fraction (1  ) is spent on
the homogeneous good, z.
For what concern the way in which the production is structured, we adopt the ad hoc
division of labor proposed by Antràs et al. (2006). Each country is endowed with two type of
inputs, Li and Hi, each supplying one unit of their corresponding factor inelastically. These
inputs are supplied by two type of workers: li and hi (the index i indicates the country). L
i
represents the amount of low skill workers and Hi the amount of high skill workers. On one
side, some low skill workers (simply called workers) are responsible for routine tasks, li, like
data entry, data processing, and database management, nancial and accounting services etc.
And on the other side high skill workers (managers) specialize in knowledge-intensive tasks, hi.
Both factors are perfectly mobile between sectors.
The fact that the production function requires the combination of these two types of inputs
will play an interesting role in an open economy situation, when we analyze the organizational
choices in the di¤erentiated sector. More specically, in relation to the FDI strategy our claim
is that the inputs realized by foreign managers in the host country cannot be considered perfect
substitute of inputs realized by managers in the home economy. For this reason the specic
knowledge-intensive tasks, hi, should be imported from the home nation. This assumption will
expose this imported inputs to trade costs. However, this is not the only cost that emerges
in this situation. We assume that managers in the home economy should "teach" foreign
workers how to realize an e¢cient outcome (reputation matters). This transfer of knowledge
generates costs linked to communication problems. The aspect of communication depends on
how communication technologies are developed in the countries.
The communication costs a¤ect the relationship between managers in the home country
and workers in the host country. As we mentioned above, only a particular rms organization
strategy will be a¤ected by these costs: market access through FDI. In this case, managers
in the home country should travel to the host country in order to give orders to the foreign
workers. As a consequence of the improvements in communication technologies, the managers
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could also give orders and guidance over the phone and the internet, using emails, and others
to workers in the host economy. When the level of communication in the host economy is not
well developed, these costs could discourage the choice in favor of FDI. Instead, when they
are not outrageously high, there could be a reason for choosing FDI. Also distance can a¤ect
the level of development of communication. For this reason, in what follow, we consider these
communication costs, fc(dist), as positively related with distance. It is convenient to observe,
that the existence of "adequate manager skills in the host country plus the availability of
su¢ciently developed communication technologies, will change completely the situation. In fact,
MNFs could become really interested in o¤shoring parts of the production process to foreign
countries. The presence of "manager skills allows a more e¢cient (time-saving) transmission of
knowledge across countries, permitting to the MNFs to avoid communication costs. However, at
least in this paper, our interest is limited to the case in which FDI strategies is more convenient.
We leave the analysis of o¤shoring strategies for another paper.
Nowadays, the role played by these vertical linkages is extremely important. The reduction
in spatial frictions, in particular, thanks to the introduction of new technologies, has contributed
enormously to the decrease in the costs of communication between managers in the home
country and workers in the host country. However, the relationship between home and host
nation is also a¤ected by the level of international barriers. The higher are international barriers,
the more di¢cult will be the contact between them and so the smaller will be the vertical
linkages, because they become too costly. In the special framework considered, the specic
knowledge needed (the high skill input), generates a situation in which the input realized by
managers in home nation have to be exported to the host economy. Obviously, in a situation
of partial free trade, the transfer of these inputs will be hit by trade costs. In the specic case
of FDI mode of market access, two di¤erent type of costs will a¤ect the behavior of the MNF:
the transport costs that hits the intermediate input imported, and the communication costs
between managers in the home and workers in the host country. Physical and cultural distances
will have a positive impact on the communication costs. For this reason, the communication
costs could be considered a particular type of distance related xed cost.
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3.2.1 Preferences
Preferences are described by the utility function :
U = z(1 )
Z
v2V
x(v)
 

dv
Consumers have identical, homothetic preferences over the two classes of goods. Furthermore,
consumers have identical preferences among varieties (V is the set of all possible varieties). So
preferences across varieties have the classical CES form. Hence, if we consider the sub-utility
function over all varieties of good x:
u =
Z
v2V
x(v)
 

dv
if we take log
u =


log
Z
v2V
x(v)

dv
where  represent the elasticity of substitution,  = " 1
"
: The solution to the utility maximiza-
tion problem6 gives us the usual demand for each variety:
x =
E
niZ
0
pi(v)1 "dv
p "i
= Aip "i (3.1)
where Ai = E
i
nZ
0
pi(v)1 "dv
. The inverse demand function is given by
p (v) = A
1
"x 
1
" = A1 x 1 (3.2)
The demand parameter  is the same in every country. This would permit to give attention to
di¤erences in organizational costs.
6The budget constraint is: Ei =
Z
v2Vh
p(v)x(v)dv
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3.2.2 Production
The homogeneous sector, z, produces a homogeneous good with constant returns to scale and
perfect competition. This good is freely traded on international markets. One unit of z requires
one unit of only one factor: li. The unit cost function is cz(wl), where wl is the wages rate
for low skill workers. This unit cost function represents marginal and average costs. In the
homogeneous sector, competition determines price equals marginal costs. Since this sector is
characterized by costlessy trade and perfect competition pz = cz(wl) = wl. It is convenient to
choose good z as the numeraire, so that pz = 1. The pricing condition will become: 1 = w

l .
As long as the homogeneous good is produced in every countries, the cost of producing the
homogenous good is equal in every country.
The di¤erentiated sector, x, produces a continuum of horizontally di¤erentiated varieties.
Each variety is produced with an increasing return to scale (at the rm level) production
function. As preferences are Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz type, a single producer competes equally
with every other producer and the same prot is obtained for each variety. As there are no
costs of product di¤erentiation, each rm will produce a di¤erent type of variety. Moreover,
since consumers preferences are characterized by "love of variety", any rm could obtain a
higher share of the market by producing a di¤erent variety, than by reproducing an existing
one. In this model with monopolistic competition, a continuum of productivity is introduced,
so that some rms are making pure prots: the rms that are not on the cuto¤ level.
To enter in the di¤erentiated sector, rms should bear the xed cost fE (measured in units
of low skill labors), that is sunk. Subsequently, each entrant draws a productivity parameter (or
labor per unit output coe¢cient, called a) from a common cumulative density function G(a)7.
Upon drawing its own productivity parameter, a rm can immediately decide to exit and not
to produce (this happens if it has a low productivity draw). Otherwise, a rm can choose to
produce; this will imply additional xed costs linked to the type of organizational form chosen.
If it chooses to produce for its own domestic market it pays the additional xed market entry
cost fD. If the rm chooses to export, it bears the additional costs fX of meeting di¤erent
market specic standards (for example, the cost of creating a distribution network in a new
7The support of the continuous random variable a is 0  a  a0. The cumulative densitiy function is the
same in every country; but the equilibrium cuto¤ change in every country.
86
country). Finally, if the rm chooses to serve through FDI, the additional costs it has to face
are fM . The latter xed cost is due to creating a distribution network in a new country as
well as to the building up of new capacities in the foreign country. This implies that fM is
composed by fD and fX : So: fD <fX < fM
8. More precisely, in order to obtain this partition
is essential that fD <
" 1fX < fM ; otherwise we lose the relationship between productivity
level and type of market access. All the xed costs are evaluated at the low skill workers wage.
Why? As it is clear from the inequality above, the exporting sector is characterized by iceberg
transport costs: selling one unit in the export market, would require the shipment of   1
units. In relation to the countrys location we will observe the exporting price increasing with
distance from the home country.
Despite the fact that we are dealing with symmetric countries, the fact that they are located
di¤erently makes distance playing a role. The role played by distance gives rise to interesting
insights. The exporting price from country 1 to country (N   1) =2 is dened as:
p2 = 1
aph

:::
p (N 1)
2
= 1
(N 1)
2
ap

h

where 1 representsthe trade costswith the nearestcountry.Aswe saw the indexissetto
gofrom 1 to N 1
2
, because we locate countriesonacircle.For whatconcernthe price ofthe
subsidiary:
p2 = (ph1)
 a

:::
p (N 1)
2
=

ph1
(N 1)
2
 a

because itincursintransportcostonlyin relationtothe intensityofhigh skilllabor inthe
production ofthe nalgood. The trade costsisconstructed in the followingway:between
country1andcountry2is1;betweencountry1andcountry3is2 = 1;betweencountry1
8fD ,fX , fM canbe consideredasvarietydevelopmentcostsor xedorganizationalcosts.
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and country 4 is 3 = 1
2 and so on until country N-1 is reached, here  (N 1)=2 = 1
(N 1)=2.
All the previous assumptions would have an implication on the productivity level that we
should observe. In particular, later will be possible to analyze how trade a¤ects the (endogenous)
range of productivity levels, the prots associated to those and the distribution of the market
shares. W e expect to observe that the productivity required for becoming an exporter or for
engaging in FDIwill be increasing with distance, as trade costs a¤ect in a negative way both
organizational forms. This implies that the ex ante probability of entrants as an exporter or as a
subsidiary will be decreasing with distance. After entry the market environment is characterized
by monopolistic competition. Last element: all rms face a constant probability of death. This
event is described by a Poisson distribution with an hazard rate  : in every period the rm
can be hit by this bad event and forced to exit. Hence, each rms value prot is:
v(a) =
1X
t=0
(1  )t(a) =
1

(a)
hence, the actual value of prots does not depend upon . For simplicity, we assume that there
is no time discounting.
How does the di¤erentiated sector works? As anticipated, the production of any variety
involves two specic inputs: li, and hi. The tasks performed by low skill workers are in-
terchangeable among countries (these are not rm specic, they are standardized). On the
contrary, even if knowledge-intensive tasks, hi are performed in every country, these are highly
rm specic. The knowledge-intensive tasks cannot be considered as perfect substitutes across
countries; i.e. the one existing in country A is strictly correlated with rms in country A. For
this reason, rms that engage in FDIprefer to import the input realized by managers from
home nation. W e could claim that these inputs are rms specic in the sense that every rm in
order to realize the specic variety needs some expertise and knowledge that has been developed
in the contest of its specic production. For this reason is not easy to substitute this knowledge
service (that could be considered as "endemic"to a particular rm)9. These vertical linkages
9In a further step we could analyze under which conditions it seems reasonable to outsource the production
of this service (by saving in transport costs, but loosing the esclusivity of the specic know how and incurring in
higher communication costs)instead of exporting that input (from home to abroad; this will permit to the rm
to keep internally its know how).
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between mother and foreign nation give rise to communication costs: managers and technicians
have to travel from home to the foreign country (or to guide over the phone or others) to teach
some specic procedures linked to the production of the specic variety (export of knowledge
related to high skill workers).
Thus the exporting sector, as well as the FDI sector, are characterized by iceberg transport
costs: selling one unit in the export market j, would require shipment from country i of   1
units for the exporting sector and  for the FDI sector. This would imply that the marginal
costs in exporting sector is higher than the one in the FDI sector (at least until when the
communication costs are not too high, and so until when distance does not play a big role).
In every country, the producers of di¤erentiated goods face an inelastic supply of low skill
labor (l) and high skill labor (h). The high skill workers are endowed with higher abilities
than low skill workers (being high or low type is exogenous). Lets assume that the inputs
combination needed to realize any variety could be well captured by a Cobb-Douglas production
function:
x (v) =
1
a

h

 
l
1  
1 
, 0 <  < 1 (3.3)
where 1a is the rm specic productivity parameter.  and (1  ) represent how relevant are
inputs from low and high skill workers for the production of each variety.  and (1  ) are
identical in every country10. As we explain above, these two tasks are qualitatively di¤erent.
When trade is open, rms in every country could decide to start export or FDI strategies. This
will depend upon their own productivity. The potential gain from sales of the nal good is:
R(v)  p (v)x (v) = A1 

1
ap

h

 
l
1  
(1 )
where we use the inverse demand function from (2) and (3). The prots for domestic rms is
given by
D = px (v)  lw  hph  wfD
where we assumed that x(v) units of variety v needs a xed amount f of low skill workers. The
10The parameters  and (1  ) are sector specic. Since we consider only one secor, they will have no subscript.
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prot form exporting is
XJ = px (v)  (lw + hph)  ij  wfX
where j is the destination country and i is the origin country. The prot for a subsidiary located
in j is
MJ = px (v)  wl   h ijph   wfc(dist)  wfM
where fc(dist) represents the xed communication costs and h ijph is the trade costs associated
to the subsidiarys imported input. A subsidiary located in the host country j, has to face both
the communication costs, which rise with distance, and the trade costs that hit the imported
inputs. In order to nd the operating prots, we solve the minimization problem of the rm.
We start by considering the subsidiary.
minL
l;h;
= wl + h ijph + 
"
x (v) 
1
aM

h

 
l
1  
1 #
the hicksian factor demands are
h = x (v) aM

w
ph
1 
l = x (v) aM (1  )
hph
w
i
Using the hicksian demands, we can write the total cost of a subsidiary as a function of the
nal output:
TCMNF = wl
 + h ijph   fc(dist)  wfM
= x (v) aM ( ijph)
 w1    fc(dist)  wfM
Combining the result obtained above for the total cost with the potential gain, it is possible to
derive an expression for the prots, which depends only upon the nal output:
MJ(a;A;) = A
1 x (v)   x (v) aM ( ijph)
 w1    fc(dist)  wfM
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hence the optimal output,
x (v) =

1
1 A
(aM ( ijph)
 w1 )
1
1 
thus we can write the expression for the equilibrium prot of the multinational rm:
MJ(a;A; ) = A

1
aM
 
1  1  
1
 ( ijph)
 w1 
 
1 
  fc(dist)  wfM
then if we use the relationship between  and ", 1  = "  1 we get
MJ(a;A; ) = Aa
1 "
M
(1  )
1 "

( ijph)
 w1 
1 "
  fc(dist)  wfM (3.4)
Note that the parameter aM is rm specic, while A and  are industry (and so country) specic.
Remember that  measures the intensity of knowledge-intensive tasks in the production of the
nal good, and A represents the amount of income spent relative to the di¤erentiated product
(so it is endogenous to the industry and exogenous to the producer of a specic variety).
In the same way it is possible to derive the total operative prots for the other organizational
forms. The prots from producingfor domestic market are
D(a;A; ) = Aia
1 "
D
(1  )
1 "

p

hw
1 
1 "
  wfD (3.5)
Finally, the prot from exporting in country j (here the quantity supplied di¤ers from above
because of Ej ):
XJ(a;A; ) = Aj ( ijaX)
1 " (1  )
1 "

p

hw
1 
1 "
  wfX (3.6)
The nal good producer will choose the type of organizational form that maximizes K(a;A; )
where k = M ;X or D: For this reason, nal good producers organize the production so as to
minimize both variable and xed costs. In what follows we will set w = 1. Since we are dealing
with symmetric countries which di¤er only in terms of their spatial location (so there is a role
for intra-industry trade), factor prices will be the same in every countries. From the equilibrium
operating prot of producing for domestic market, D(a;A; ),
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Aia
1 "
Di
(1  )
1 "

p

h
1 "
= fD (3.7)
we can derive the equilibrium cuto¤ condition. Setting Bi = (1 )A
i
1 "
, we obtain
a1 "Di =
fD
Bi

p

h
1 "
From the equilibrium operating prot of exporting in country j (here the quantity supplied
di¤ers from above because of Ej ), XJ(a;A; ):
Aj
 
i ijaXj
1 " (1  )
1 "

p

h
1 "
= fX (3.8)
and using Bj = (1 )A
j
1 "
and 1 "ij  , we derive the following equilibrium cuto¤
a1 "Xj =
fX
Bj
 
i ij
1 " 
p

h
1 "
In order to nd the cuto¤ for rms engaged in FDI, we should compare the operating prots
from doing FDI with the operating prot from doing export. This because by construction, a
rm will choose to do FDI in country j if only if the production abroad is more protable than
exports, i.e. if this holds Mij   Xij  fc(dist) + (w +  ijph) fM   (w + ph) fX . Thus the
operating prot of doing FDI in country j; MJ(a;A; ) is
Aja
1 "
Mj
(1  )
1 "
h 
i ij
(1 ")
 
 
i ij
1 "i
p
(1 ")
h = fc(dist) + fM   fX (3.9)
which gives the following equilibrium cuto¤
a1 "Mj =
fc(dist) + fM   fX
Bj
h 
i ij
(1 ")
 
 
i ij
1 "i
p
(1 ")
h
aDi; aXj and aMj represent the cuto¤ marginal costs from entering the domestic market,
the foreign market as exporter or as subsidiary.   1 " is the freeness of trade. Since
1
a represents the labor productivity and " is set to be strictly greater that 1, a
1 " could be
considered a productivity index. All the prots described above are increasing function of
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a1 ": Independently on the type of activity, the more productive is a rm, the more prots
it will make. Upon observing its productivity level, the di¤erentiated good producer chooses
the ownership structure that maximizes its prots, or exits the market. This latter outcome
will happen whenever the productivity level, 1a , is below a threshold level,
1
aDi
. We can also
talk in terms of marginal cost: if the marginal cost is above a certain threshold level, aDi, the
rm exits form the market and forfeits the xed cost of entry. This threshold depends on the
consumption index, A.
It is straightforward to see that KJ(a;A; ) is decreasing in variable and xed costs; for
this reason the rm prefer to organize production so as to minimize these costs. fD, fX and fM
represent respectively the component of the xed cost that domestic, exporting and subsidiary
rms have to bear.
Free Entry
Free entry ensures equality between the expected operating prots of a potential entrant and
the entry cost, fE . This condition holds for all type of rms. This implies that the cumulative
density function is G(a) =

a
a0
k
; hence the support is: 0:::: a0, where for simplicity we can set
a0 = 1:This condition can be expressed as
aDZ
0
[
Ea1 "

p

h
1 "
n"
  fD]dG(a) + 2
N 1
2X
i=0
f
aXZ
aM
[
ia1 "E

p

h
1 "
n"
  fX ]dG(a)+
aMZ
0
[

i

Ea1 "

p

h
1 "
n"
  fc(dist)  fM ]dG(a)g = fE (3.10)
where i =
 
i
1 "
and  is the well known freeness of trade. i is the parameter that takes
into consideration the di¤erent country locations. Using equations (7)-(10) plus the price index
we can nd implicit solutions for the cuto¤ coe¢cients. As long as the change in country size
is not too large, incomplete specialization is preserved in every country, along with FPE.
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Price Index
The price index in country i is characterized by all the brands o¤ered in that country. M ore
precisely, the brands o¤ered by domestic rms have a consumer price of a=, brands o¤ered
by foreign exporters have a consumer price of ai= and a
 
i

= for foreign subsidiaries.
As rms will start producing only if they have at least a productivity of 1aD , the probability
distribution of being an exporter (or FDI) is conditioned on the probability of successful entry:
G(a=aD)
11. Please note that the upper bound of the cost distribution so that rms survive,
aD, is identical for every country.
nZ
0
pi(v)1 "dv =
1
1 "
aDZ
0

aph
1 "
dG(a=aD)+
1
1 "
2
N 1
2X
i=0
2
4aMZ
0

i
 
aph
1 "
dG(a=aD) +
aXZ
aB
i
 
aph
1 "
dG(a=a
3.2.3 Param etrization:ParetoDistribution
The fact that the free entry condition and the price index depend upon probability distribution
implies that if we want an explicit solution for them we need to assume a particular functional
form for G(a). Following the empirical literature on rms size distribution it seems reasonable
to use as an approximation the Pareto distribution. The cumulative distribution function of a
Pareto random variable a with the shape parameter k is:
G(a) =

a
a0
k
(3.11)
where k and a0 are the shape and scale parameter, respectively. Note that k=1 implies
a uniform distribution on [0; a0]. The shape parameter k represents the dispersion of cost
draws. An increase in k would imply an increase in the number of high cost rms (the shape
of the cumulative distribution becomes more convex). The support of the distribution, 0::::a0,
is identical for every country. a0 represents the upper bound of this distribution. In order
to avoid innite variance we should consider an upper bound on the highest possible level of
productivity, or a minimum value for the marginal cost. Figure 1 in the Appendix describe the
marginal cost that is induced by G(a). The productivity distribution of surviving rms will
11 It is exploited the fractal nature of the Pareto.
94
also be Pareto with shape k; and the truncated cost distribution is given by:
G(a=aD) =

a
aD
k
with a 2 [0; aD].
Price Index with Pareto distribution
As rms will o¤er a price only if they have at least a productivity of 1aD , the cumulative
distribution is dened on a support 0::::::aD, so it is: G(a) =

a
aD
k
: Solving the price index
we will obtain:
 =
1
1  1
a1 "D [1 + 2T
1 
N 1
2X
i=0
 
i

+ 2V 1 
N 1
2X
i=0
h 
i

  i
i
(3.12)
where  = k" 1 ; 
1 " = ;
 
i
1 "
= i; fX=fD = T and (fc(dist) + fM   fX)=fD = V:
Free entry condition using the Pareto distribution:
Also the free entry could be rewritten considering the parametrization assumed. However, here
the support is 0:::: a0, because every type of rm can enter. For simplicity we can set a0 = 1:
E

ph
1 "
n"
[
aDZ
0
(a1 "   fD)dG(a) + 2
N 1
2X
i=0
aMZ
0
(a1 "
 
i

  (fc(dist) + fM )dG(a)+
+2
N 1
2X
i=0
aXZ
aM
(a1 "
 
i

  fX)dG(a)] = fE (3.13)
where  is the price index.
3.3 GeneralEquilibrium with N countries
In order to analyze the main implications of this model, we exploit the fact that all xed coef-
cients are the same in every country and that the distribution function is the same. However,
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the existence of N countries located along a circle introduces a role for distance in determining
the di¤erent organizational forms. Using the price index found in (12) inside the domestic cuto¤
conditions (7), we nd the equilibrium number of varieties (and so of existing rms) consumed
in a typical nation:
n =
(   1)

ph
1 "
E
"fD[1 + 2T 1 
N 1
2X
i=0
(i) + 2V 1 
N 1
2X
i=0
[(i)   i]

]
Following Baldwins notation, we dene 2T 1 
N 1
2X
i=0
 
i

= 
, and, on the other hand,
2V 1 
N 1
2X
i=0
 
i

  i

= 	. Where 	 and 
 could be consider as parameters that sum-
marizes the impact of trade costs on exports and on FDI. Then, the expression for n could be
simplied to:
n =
(   1)

ph
1 "
E
"fD [1 + 
 +	]
(3.14)
the number of entrants is decreasing in 	 and 
 which represent a measure of higher xed and
variable trade costs in export and FDI sectors respectively:Using the free entry condition in
(13), and the cuto¤ conditions in (7)-(9), we could get explicit closed form solutions for aD,
aX ; and aM .
aD = a0
2
4 (   1) ph1 " fE
   (   1)p
(1 ")
h fD(1 + 	 + 
)

3
5
1
k
(3.15)
Using (15) inside the ratio between (8) and (7) we nd
aX = a0
2
4 (   1) ph1 " fEh
   (   1)p
(1 ")
h
i
fX(1 + 	 + 
)
 
i

T 1 
3
5
1
k
(3.16)
Finally, using (15) inside the ratio between (9) and (7) we obtain the equilibrium cuto¤ if MNF
aM = a0
2
4 (   1) ph1 " fEh
   (   1)p
(1 ")
h
i
(1 + 	 + 
)
h 
i

 
 
i
i V 1 
fc(dist) + fM   fX
3
5
1
k
(3.17)
96
Conversely to Helpman et al. (2004), the cuto¤s di¤er in relation to the geographical
location of the destination country. In fact, equations (14)-(17) change in relation to how
many countries belong to this trade bloc. Since countries are equally spaced along the circle,
the above equations are the same for every country. This imply that countries are perfectly
symmetric among each other, but the existence of di¤erent spatial distributions determines
distance dependent cuto¤s.
3.3.1 Number of Entrants, Producers, Exporters and MNFs
As it is clear from above, rms are distinguished into four groups. Firms that do not produce
at all, a > aD; rms that sell domestically, aD  a > 0; rms that sell domestically and also
export, aX  a > aM ; nally rms that sell domestically and build subsidiary in foreign country,
aM  a > 0. These types are determined by the existence of three di¤erent xed organizational
costs, discussed previously. This explain the three cuto¤ levels in each country, i.e. thresholds
for marginal costs: aD, aX and aM . Firms draw from the marginal cost distribution G(a),
where a is the marginal costs, considered as the continuos random variable; n represents the
mass of rms with any given level of "a". Hence nG(a) represents the steady state distribution
of a. Through n12 we can calculate the mass of rms existing in each category. From equation
(14) we can see that a rise in the trade costs, fX , fM ; fc(dist) and 
i reduces the the number
of existing rms.
3.3.2 The Role of Distance
Since empirical nding is much richer than the scale-vs-proximity models predict, we created
a model with N countries located along a circle so that to analyze the spatial distribution of
a¢liates. Since distance play an important role in determining organizational form of rms, we
could analyse how distance interacts with the existence of MNF. There are two way through
which distance enters in the rms prots. First, through the communication costs, fc(dist),
which reects the communication needs between managers in the home country and workers
in the host country. Secondly, through the part of intermediate inputs that incur in trade
costs because imported. Comparing the prots from doing FDI and from exporting, we could
12n is a primitive number that indicates every type of rm entering in the market.
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ask under which conditions, the prots from doing FDI is bigger than the prots from doing
exports,
MJ(a;A; )
?
? XJ(a;A; ) (3.18)
Considering the same level of productivity we can solve the above inequality so as to put in
evidence the role played by the communication costs. In particular, we want to observe for
which value of the communication costs (18) is true. Thus we can rewrite the equation above
in the following way
Aja
1 " (1  )
1 "
h 
i ijph
i1 "
  fc(dist
i)  fM > A
 
i ija
1 " (1  )
1 "

ph
1 "
  fX
hence,
Aja
1 " (1  )
1 "

ph
1 " h 
i

 
 
i
i
  fM   fX > fc(dist
i)
When distance is small enough this inequality holds. However, when distance becomes im-
portant, the condition above is more likely to be satised when  increases, so when there is
an improvement in trade openness, since the term
 
i

 
 
i

is decreasing with liber-
alization. This would imply that engaging in FDI activity is more likely in a contest of free
trade.
What is the role of distance on the a¢liate sales? First of all, lets dene the aggregate
a¢liate sales in the case of two countries:
SA =
aMR
0
Aja
1 " (1  )
1 "
 
ph
1 "  
i

g(a)da
=

aM
aD
k
a1 "M
k
k   "+ 1
Aj
(1  )
1 "
 
ph
1 "  
i

The rst term, (aM=aD)
k, represents the cumulative probability of rms from the origin country
to own an a¢liate in the destination country. As we said before, if we multiply this term with
the total mass of rms from the origin country, nG(aM ), we obtain the number of a¢liate in
the destination country. The remaining part of that expression represents average sales. Since
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we are dealing with N symmetric countries, the overall aggregate sales are:
SA =
N 1
2X
i=0

aM
aD
k
a1 "M
k
k   "+ 1
Aj
(1  )
1 "
 
ph
1 "  
i

(3.19)
From the expression above, we see that aM is positively related to the number of a¢liates
producing in foreign countries, while it is negatively related with the average size of foreign
a¢liates. Di¤erentiating (19) with respect to aM
@SA
@aM
=

aM
aD
k
a "M kAj
(1  )
1 "
 
ph
1 "  
i

> 0
we see that aM , the threshold marginal cost of being a MNF, is positively related to aggregate
a¢liate sales. Hence, we can conclude that, as long as k  ", the aggregate sales are positively
a¤ected by a change in the threshold marginal cost.
What can be said about the relationship between aggregate sales of a¢liates and distance?
First of all, we will use the zero-prots condition to derive the e¤ect of distance on the threshold
marginal cost, aM
MJ(a;A; ) = Aja
1 "
Mj
(1  )
1 "
h 
i

 
 
i
i
p
(1 ")
h   fc(dist
i)  fM + fX
where do not assume any particular functional form for fc(dist). Moreover, we should be careful
because in the expression above distance is not directly observable, since: i 
 
i
1 "
. Hence,
when distance is high (so when i is large), i will be small. Solving the expression above for
aM
aM =
 
fc(dist
i) + fM   fX
Bj [(i)   (i)] p
(1 ")
h
! 1
1 "
where Bj was dened before. Deriving this expression with respect to i we nd
@aM
@i
=
1
1  "
 
fc(dist
i) + fM   fX
Bj [(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i)] p
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h
! 1
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 1
99
264 f 0(i)
Bj [(i)   (i)] p
(1 ")
h
 
 
fc(dist
i) + fM   fX

(
(i)

i
  )
Bj
h
[(i)   (i)]p
(1 ")
h
i2
3
75
Since " > 1,the rstterm isnegative;the secondterm ismore di¢culttointerpretbecause is
noteasytoknow whatisthe sign of
(i)

i
  .Ifthisterm ispositive,then forvaluesofi
su¢cientlysmall13,the term inside the square bracketwouldbe negative.Thiswouldimplya
positive sign ofthe derivative,
@aM
@i
> 0
Hence,when distance isnottoosmallthe e¤ectofdistance on the cuto¤ marginalcostis
alwaysnegative14.Therefore,since overallaggregate salesare positivelyrelatedtothe threshold
marginalcost,itisimmediate toconclude thatwhen distance issu¢cientlyhigh,aggregate sales
are decreasingin distance.Thisresultsisin line withrecentempiricalndings.
Since i representsan increase in the trade costsdue todi¤erentlocation ofrms,we could
interpretthe increase in i asan increase in the initialtrade bloc,soasan increase in the circle
dimension.Thus,given the above ndingswe can predictthatan increase in the dimension of
the trade bloc,inducesareduction on aM,thatimpliesadecrease areduction in the a¢liates
aggregate sales.
W hatisthe role ofdistance on export? Itcould be interestingtocompare the e¤ectof
distance on MNFsactivitiesvs.exportactivities.Forthispurpose,in whatfollow we consider
the e¤ectofdistance on exportsales.Letsdene the aggregate exportsalesin the case oftwo
countries:
SX =
aXR
aM
Aj
 
i

a1 "
(1  )
1 "

p

h
1 "
= Aj
 
i
 (1  )
1 "

p

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1 " k
akD

ak "+1X   a
k "+1
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
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13Smallvaluesofi would implythatthe communication cost,fc(dist
i),ishigh.
14highvaluesof implyasmall,andsogiven the sign ofthe derivative asmallaM :
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Deriving this expression with respect to aX and aM we nd that
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=  
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1
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D
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ph
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> 0
As expected, export sales are increasing in aX , the threshold marginal cost of being an exporter,
and decreasing in aM . In order to analyse the relationship between aggregate export sales and
distance, we will use the zero-prots condition to derive the e¤ect of distance on both the
threshold aM and aX . We already know from the analysis above that @aM=@
i > 0, which
means: as long as distance is not too small the cuto¤ marginal cost aM is negatively a¤ected
by distance. On the other side for what concern aX
aXj =
 
fX
Bj (i)

ph
1 "
! 1
1 "
hence
@aXj
@i
=  

fX
Bj(i)[ph]
1 "

(1  ")i
1
1 "
> 0
the e¤ect of distance on the cuto¤ marginal cost aX is unambiguously positive.
3.4 The Impact of Trade
In the present framework, with N symmetric countries, we observe the e¤ect of opening to
trade. Since fE does not change in the transition from autarky to trade, the FE conditions are
left una¤ected by trade: regardless of prot di¤erences across rms (relative to export or FDI
status), the expected value of future prots, in equilibrium, must equal the xed investment
cost fE (sunk cost). Hence, as in Melitz2003, the transition from autarky to open economy, will
move up the ZCP curve: the exposure to trade induces an increase in the cuto¤ productivity
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level (

1
aD
T
>

1
aD
A
)15. This will modify the productivity level of the least productive
rms. In an open economy situation, a rm with a productivity level between

1
aD
A
and
1
aD
T
cannot earn positive prots and so will exit from the market. Moreover, as pointed
out by Melitz, another selection process acts: rms with productivity level above

1
aX

or
above and

1
aM

enter respectively as exporters or as subsidiary. These three e¤ects are called
domestic market selection e¤ect, export market selection e¤ect and FDImarket selection e¤ect.
These e¤ects reallocate market shares towards more e¢cient rms, and generate an increase in
the overall productivity.
The transition toward the open economy situation generates a reduction in the number
of rms operating in every country16. The equilibrium number of rms in each country will
represent the total number of rms selling in that country: total number of domestics rms,
foreign exporters and multinationals. The number of rms decreases as a consequence of the
domestic market selection e¤ect (aD #). However, as the entrance of new foreign rms more
than compensate this reduction, consumers typically enjoy a larger amount of varieties.
3.5 Conclusions
The paper analyses the choice between FDI and Exports in a framework where the existence of
intermediate inputs makes MNF activities a¤ected by trade costs. Some asymmetries between
countries, in terms of di¤erent country locations, are assumed. The production of the nal
good variety requires a particular input combination between services and labor manufacture.
Hence, when a subsidiary is built abroad this service input has to be imported from the home
nation. This makes the total marginal costs of selling via FDI rising with distance. The
relationship between home and foreign nations gives rise to communication costs. The existence
of intermediate inputs and communication costs leads to a result in which the ratio of MNF
rms shrinks. We found that under certain condition the aggregate a¢liate sales are decreasing
with distance. While the amount of exports is increasing with distance. This result is consistend
with the recent empirical ndings.
15Recall that the ZPC are downward sloping and the FE conditions are upward sloping.
16As in Melitz, M < MA, where MA represents the number of rms in autarky.
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